Recent comments in /f/philosophy
[deleted] t1_itc80bz wrote
Reply to comment by [deleted] in Philip Kitcher argues that morality is a social technology designed to solve problems emerging from the fragility of human altruism. Morality can be evaluated objectively, but without assuming moral truths. The view makes sense against a Darwinian view of life, but it is not social Darwinism. by Ma3Ke4Li3
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TMax01 t1_itc00p7 wrote
Reply to comment by Capital_Net_6438 in /r/philosophy Open Discussion Thread | October 17, 2022 by BernardJOrtcutt
> whether a hot dog is or is not a sandwich is surely dramatically different from whether Pluto is a planet.
Not really even a little bit, for all the reasons already discussed, as I will again explain:
> With Pluto I take it at a broad level of description people are looking at whatever data, trying to systematize it in accordance with whatever empirical/logical criteria
Nope. Now, granted, because the issue with Pluto is a very limited one in several ways, your mistaken notion of systemization is closer to being realistic. But it highlights the inadequacy of that model at the same time.
First, in that case there undoubtably is an explicit authority involved. And in theory they are only dispassionately determining what category and object belongs in. But what happens in real life? Rather than describe the issue as "whether astronomers call Pluto a planet or a dwarf planet" becomes "whether Pluto is a planet", with 'dwarf' planet being a 'demotion' (whether something is a "dwarf" is no different than whether it is a "sandwich", syntax be damned) and a tempestuous argument because it involves whether school children will learn the same "nine planets" their parents did.
Words aren't words in science. They're merely alphabetic symbols for mathematical quantities or logic categories chosen to resemble words, effectively as a mnemonic device. Science works well, because math (aka logic) works well, for physical objects, which can't intentionally change their behavior because they don't like what someone said. Whether you should care about what a scientist says depends on whether the math works out, it never actually has anything to do with the meaning of the words as descriptors for what they measured to produce quantities for their calculations. Unless you believe scientists are priests who's moral dictates must be followed, they are not in charge of what words we use.
Now the problem is that the word "science" is, like "finger", a word. Whether something is "science" actually depends entirely on why someone might call it science, or why someone might not. We again are taught that there is a "concept" or "category" the label confers and by which we can infer validity and certainty in an absolute sense, and there are, of course, good reasons for that notion.. But they revolve around the justifications for calling something science (the process, the empiricism, the mathematical predictions of future objectively quantifiable results) not any magic power the 'label' has. 'Science', ultimately, is a word, and like all words it isn't a label for a logical category of "thing", it is an identifier and descriptor who's validity depends on whether it is recognized as accurate within a particular context, not any existential ability to be calculated True of False in a universal sense. People who are emotionally certain that language is (or must be, or wouldn't work unless it was, or would benefit by being) a formal system then invent new 'categories' like soft science to maintain their faith in their assumed conclusion when their initial argument can no longer be defended. Is psychology actually science or a scholarly tradition of myths? There are philosophers (themselves assuming conclusions and wishing dearly for philosophy itself to be an analytic science) who insist that all science is myth-building, and only consciousness truly exists.
>Thus the 5 is not a number example. I imagine you’d be reticent to acquiesce in that alleged revelation?
I believe you really mean whether 5 (or any other number) is real, rather than whether 5 is a number. I am very familiar with the "located in time and space" criteria. I would not describe my position as reticent, acquiescence, or allegation, but actual revelation: it is the same question as whether a hot dog is a sandwich. As an object, all sandwiches can be located in time and space. As a category of thing, "sandwich" does not occur in time or space. Whether a restaurant puts it in the "sandwiches" section of their menu is as potentially trivial and potentially consequential as whether astronomers regard Pluto as a planet, or whether school children learn to recite that categorization as if it was a fact.
> I guess one thing I suspect is that they don’t care much about being faithful to a common concept of planet or finger or whatever.
They definitely do; their entire worldview would unravel (according to the dogma of their faith, although in real life the change would be less dramatic and more beneficial, since their worldview is inaccurate in this regard) if words weren't empty symbols used as arbitrary labels for "concepts" and logical categories for "concepts" which are themselves "concepts". This explains the supposedly revelatory explanation of the status of a thumb as a finger that initiated your dive down the rabbit hole of existential epistemology because it rocked your worldview.
Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.
iiioiia t1_itbzuqi wrote
Reply to comment by Bodywithoutorgans18 in [Peter Harrison] Why religion is not going away and science will not destroy it by BasketCase0024
> Can you name something that exists outside of the physical material world
Causality.
Human delusion and hubris.
> and also tell me how you know it exists.
People complain about the consequences of it, passionately and endlessly, but never the causes themselves (beyond cartoonishly simplistic misrepresentations, the contents of which are largely seeded into our minds from largely unknown sources).
> > > > Also would you agree that religion should have no role in medicine because medicine is in the material physical world.
I would not, because the situation is not yet understood well enough to move to a conclusion forming stage.
This seems like a half decent example of the cartoonish conceptualization of the world I mention above.
[deleted] t1_itbx5ob wrote
MattVibes t1_itbt79p wrote
Right, so I have just read the Cyborg Manifesto by Donna Haraway. it is described as brilliant by some and the precursor to identity politics Neo-progressivism.The core ideas are that the text criticises classical feminist theories by denouncing their faithfulness to that male-female distinction, and criticising all the faults of humanism: race, disability etc. Instead, we should go beyond (post) humanism to a less 'categorical' distinction in society.
Now, I don't understand how this text can be considered academic in the slightest. It is in the title, a MANIFESTO! It is an ideological discourse, no justifications are made whatsoever and it just comes in with sweeping remarks and emotional upheaval. To me, it represents everything that is wrong with Philosophy today and the reason I personally do not want to pursue academic philosophy anymore.The main critique for me is moreover the effect it has had. A justification I can see for its ideological discourse is that it makes you think, it makes you want to explore this subject further by giving you an emotional response. Okay, fine. It also seeks to improve society by challenging concepts of gender, race and many 'woke' theories today follow in its footsteps, and judging by Donna Haraway's more modern writings and lectures, was supposed to allow that.
My main critique here is: We have destroyed the male-female barrier and replaced it by 81 barriers and distinctions. Is that really what it was all about? I simply don't understand. If the point of this text was to break down the barriers, why has it contented itself by creating 81+ barriers instead of 2?! In regards to race, this text has certainly not brought about the destruction of 'race' but instead has resulted in the fortification of race as a distinction of humans. Race is now an identity, more so that it ever was.
What happened, then?
Gentlerwiserfree t1_itblnle wrote
Reply to comment by Capital_Net_6438 in /r/philosophy Open Discussion Thread | October 17, 2022 by BernardJOrtcutt
Those aren’t possible.
You have no understanding of math or science.
Capital_Net_6438 t1_itbh3zt wrote
Reply to comment by Gentlerwiserfree in /r/philosophy Open Discussion Thread | October 17, 2022 by BernardJOrtcutt
It seems like you are missing the thrust of the number 5 example. Here goes again. Possible: math professors get together to discuss (er) math. Possible: after much deliberation, math professors announce that 5 is not a number. They’ve recalculated, so to speak.
Do you agree the above are possible? So far we’re just talking people doing things of varying degrees of normalcy and weirdness.
Then enters philosophy: how should I as a person who strives to be cognitively responsible, respond? I assume I can’t just waive it out of hand. A lot of weird stuff has been discovered. Allegedly, a spatially located object could be neither in location A, nor B, nor… That’s a thing right? I mean if that weren’t already a thing and physicists announced it tomorrow, I’d say: what the what. Pass the joint, physicists.
Again: what mathematicians say don’t make it so it not so.
Capital_Net_6438 t1_itbg8wq wrote
Reply to comment by TMax01 in /r/philosophy Open Discussion Thread | October 17, 2022 by BernardJOrtcutt
Thanks for the response. There’s a lot there so I’ll just respond to a few.
First a very minor thing. I don’t think I was aware of this hot dog/sandwich thing. However, it seems to the situation as far as whether a hot dog is or is not a sandwich is surely dramatically different from whether Pluto is a planet. (I think that’s better as an example than the thumb or color situations, for reasons that I’ll perhaps get to.) With Pluto I take it at a broad level of description people are looking at whatever data, trying to systematize it in accordance with whatever empirical/logical criteria. And they say Pluto is or is not a planet.
Are there people looking at data trying to systematize analogously to figure out whether hot dogs should be classified as sandwiches in our best empirical theory of edibles? I guess sandwich and planet seem to me like relevantly different kinds of concepts with respect to a potential effort to discover how they carve up reality. But I’m open to persuasion on this.
As far as green being a color: I don’t think mainstream physics says green isn’t a color. I think they claim to have discovered the (admittedly surprising) nature of green and color, which is whatever involved fact about light and reflection and whatnot.
I am reticent to acquiesce in a conclusion by a group of investigators that really seems in conflict with how I thought my concepts worked at a basic level. Thus the 5 is not a number example. I imagine you’d be reticent to acquiesce in that alleged revelation?
Context: It’s interesting you mention that because I’ve been thinking along those lines for thumb, Pluto, etc. We take our concepts (I know you don’t like that term!) to connect up with reality as a team. So the scientists do whatever ferreting about planets and discover the whole affiliated team fits better if Pluto is not a planet. I assume my concept is theirs and therefore there is this chain reaction whereby I don’t think of Pluto as a planet.
I really should study in detail what these people are drawing on in the various examples (Pluto, time, thumb, monkey). I guess one thing I suspect is that they don’t care much about being faithful to a common concept of planet or finger or whatever.
I agree on the importance of context I think generally. But I think pretty much the same questions remain about the relationship b/been my planet classifications and the astronomers.
BryKKan t1_itbg3s2 wrote
Reply to comment by VitriolicViolet in The real practical value of philosophy comes not through focusing on the ‘ideal’ life, but through helping us deal with life’s inevitable suffering: MIT professor Kieran Setiya on how philosophy can help us navigate loneliness, grief, failure, injustice, & the absurd. by philosophybreak
And?
That proves the philosophical "toolset" you propose is flawed. It allows you to derive both. A premise that leads to Hitler being justified is problematic, to say the least.
A philosophy that relies on luck, rather than shared principles, also has little value. It requires accepting an unjust world - not just that we live in one, but also that we needn't do anything about it.
I don't see how any philosophy which allows such cavalier treatment of human lives, which consciences the unjust suffering of your peers for the sake of your own gain, can ever be morally useful.
Musikcookie t1_itbfuui wrote
Reply to comment by [deleted] in What we don't owe the future | Longtermism is a philosophy of grandiose ambition but short on useful insights. Our moral obligation is to improve the society we live in, not the ones to come. by IAI_Admin
I meant the article. I said it “feels dumb”, with emphasis on “feels” because I did read it, but that’s all. I didn’t put a lot of research into it.
However, the article from my recollection just says why “longtermism” doesn’t work which is because it doesn’t give any concrete advice on what to do now. Again, this is not my final word on it, however I think it’s a bit of a lazy critique. I can come up with some ideas and moral categories for such a “longtermism” pretty much on the spot. Furthermore, it’s the critique of a philosophical direction, that seems rather academically encapsulated. I haven’t seen a person or politician be a follower of longtermism. To be honest, from what I understand it very much sounds more like a component than a moral framework. I could only understand the critique in the article if it was advocated as a complete and exclusive moral framework, but then it seems like someone is arguing against some idea that most likely will die off soon anyway.
I guess I found the article to be quite extensive for the goal it tried to reach. I also was afraid of it for being some Jordan Peterson style shit where it’s like “hey, don’t worry about the future. Future generations will figure out how to sort out the mess we leave now. Cause you know, it’s so hard to care about the future, like we’d actually have to put effort into it. Let’s not do it.” But I looked into the person behind this article a bit and it doesn’t seem like that on the surface.
PositiveStrength5694 t1_itbfacg wrote
Reply to What we don't owe the future | Longtermism is a philosophy of grandiose ambition but short on useful insights. Our moral obligation is to improve the society we live in, not the ones to come. by IAI_Admin
Personally, I can think of many things this kind of thinking can help us with. For instance in terms of political and institutional decision making, many decisions are made on a time span of an election cycle or for the next consensus, because that is the thing politicians are rated on. If we look at political decisions, there are many that are obviously beneficial for the next couple years and harmful in 10 years or future generations, and many times one can easily think of an alternative that benefits the now less, but is much less harmful or even beneficial for the future. E.g. the rate on sovereign debt most countries take on is completely irrational when looking at the expected results of decisions to take on more debt today on a time span of even 20 years. Now I do not expect people to start to think in centuries or longer time spans, but if decisions we taken looking at a more long-term time span that would already provide a better would for our children and their children and their children ...
[deleted] t1_itbeue5 wrote
Musikcookie t1_itb8zco wrote
Reply to comment by [deleted] in What we don't owe the future | Longtermism is a philosophy of grandiose ambition but short on useful insights. Our moral obligation is to improve the society we live in, not the ones to come. by IAI_Admin
No. But we can do research for recycling technology and make sure energy for those smart phones is produced sustainably.
Also it’s on a scale. You can do it more or less environmentally friendly. So even if we just lived less unsustainably, it’d already be better than just being like “there’s no phone fairy so it’s just a moral quandary, oh well”.
[deleted] t1_itb8p88 wrote
ShalmaneserIII t1_itb8iud wrote
Reply to comment by MyNameIsNonYaBizniz in The real practical value of philosophy comes not through focusing on the ‘ideal’ life, but through helping us deal with life’s inevitable suffering: MIT professor Kieran Setiya on how philosophy can help us navigate loneliness, grief, failure, injustice, & the absurd. by philosophybreak
So let's rephrase your point: "I'm not enjoying life, therefore no humans who are enjoying life should exist."
Sounds a bit extreme, doesn't it?
A second thing to ask is why we'd remotely be obligated to keep all people happy instead of just most, or even some. People who don't want to exist are, in most cases, one jump away from not. If they don't want to do that either, well...not our problem.
Musikcookie t1_itb83s7 wrote
Reply to comment by [deleted] in What we don't owe the future | Longtermism is a philosophy of grandiose ambition but short on useful insights. Our moral obligation is to improve the society we live in, not the ones to come. by IAI_Admin
Yup. But just because something is, doesn’t mean it has to stay that way.
[deleted] t1_itb7wzc wrote
Musikcookie t1_itb709n wrote
Reply to comment by [deleted] in What we don't owe the future | Longtermism is a philosophy of grandiose ambition but short on useful insights. Our moral obligation is to improve the society we live in, not the ones to come. by IAI_Admin
Well you habe no answer because you are begging the question. Your premise is that life is unsustainable. Which it isn’t inherently.
However currently most people - and I don’t exclude myself here - live unsustainably. And when you admit defeat before you try, that will never change.
Gentlerwiserfree t1_itb63gk wrote
Reply to comment by Capital_Net_6438 in /r/philosophy Open Discussion Thread | October 17, 2022 by BernardJOrtcutt
If “they” didn’t decide that 5 is a number in the first place, how could they change and decide it’s not?
If some group of professors got together and decided to declare that 5 isn’t a number, how could that affect the real world?
They could send out some guidance of how math teachers are supposed to teach differently, but schools would all ignore it. There just isn’t any organization with that kind of power in most of the world.
Even if in, say, North Korea, they decided to try that, it would probably involve creating a new symbol or word for 5.
Math simply does not work if you try to pretend that adding 4+1 is impossible.
I guess the point I’m trying to make is that there is no “they”. There is no board of experts that can make a declaration like that. It’s an extremely childish worldview to believe that there could be (again, aside from places like North Korea).
Humans realizing that they were wrong to label Pluto the same way they labeled Neptune, Uranus, etc. does not affect anything that happens in space. It’s the reverse, actually — when humans realize that their labeling systems are wrong, the humans must change. If a human scientist insists that since they learned xyz when they were a child, xyz must be true, despite evidence, then that human is not a true scientist and is harming humanity.
Saying “Actually, Pluto isn’t really a planet” (that is, “Actually, bodies in space under a certain size have certain properties that make them different from planets”) is no different from saying “Actually, the Earth revolves around the Sun and not the other way around” all those centuries ago.
The whole “dwarf planet” thing was done to placate people who are uncomfortable with science, and that’s something any thinking person should be uncomfortable with.
(Also, if there were a board of scientists that powerful, tobacco would no longer be a thing. If only.)
[deleted] t1_itb61nz wrote
Bodywithoutorgans18 t1_itb5d73 wrote
Reply to comment by WrongAspects in [Peter Harrison] Why religion is not going away and science will not destroy it by BasketCase0024
>Can you name something that exists outside of the physical material world and also tell me how you know it exists.
I know that there are other dimensions beyond our own and that matter exists in them. I know this because dark matter and other elements "exist". How many there are in total? I couldn't say. 10 seems to be an agreeable number at the moment.
Can you tell me a profound conclusion on this level that science can actually answer for me? I like science. I think it is useful. We have been following the threads of science for multiple generations now. Every single time science declares it has all of the answers though, another rabbit hole appears. Almost like a carrot on a stick, the true answers always just slightly out of arms' reach. Perhaps that is by design?
Honuhonuhonu t1_itb19i9 wrote
Reply to The real practical value of philosophy comes not through focusing on the ‘ideal’ life, but through helping us deal with life’s inevitable suffering: MIT professor Kieran Setiya on how philosophy can help us navigate loneliness, grief, failure, injustice, & the absurd. by philosophybreak
“Inevitable suffering” - I think I’ll skip His class
Aggravating_Roe t1_itazsqx wrote
Reply to comment by ConfusedObserver0 in What we don't owe the future | Longtermism is a philosophy of grandiose ambition but short on useful insights. Our moral obligation is to improve the society we live in, not the ones to come. by IAI_Admin
Interesting spottings and I agree!
Gathorall t1_itazsed wrote
Reply to comment by johnnyblueye in The real practical value of philosophy comes not through focusing on the ‘ideal’ life, but through helping us deal with life’s inevitable suffering: MIT professor Kieran Setiya on how philosophy can help us navigate loneliness, grief, failure, injustice, & the absurd. by philosophybreak
No, philosophy is in a disgraceful state.
Ma3Ke4Li3 OP t1_itc9d28 wrote
Reply to comment by mytwocentsshowmanyss in Philip Kitcher argues that morality is a social technology designed to solve problems emerging from the fragility of human altruism. Morality can be evaluated objectively, but without assuming moral truths. The view makes sense against a Darwinian view of life, but it is not social Darwinism. by Ma3Ke4Li3
A reasonable question.
Short answer: many people think that morals are either relativistic (different cultures, different moralities) or absolutist (everyone should have the same morals). Both positions lead people to be very confused.
The relativistic position seems to say that there is nothing that people from outside a culture can say to disagree about a cultural practice. Slavery is right if the culture thinks its right. Imperialism is right if the culture thinks its right. And so on.
On the other hand, absolutism seems to be problematic, too. Where are these moral truths written? Who has the moral truth?
This confusion bothers many. If it does not bother you, that's fine. But it has bothered me. Some are so puzzled that they conclude that morality and ethics must be groundless fictions, and so, they end up nihilistic. Nothing matters, and all that.
Kitcher tris to offer a middle ground. His position tries to make sense of ethics in a way that does not presume some realm of absolute moral truths. It is not as mysterious as absolutism. It also assumes that what a good life looks life will differ based on the cultural situation you find yourself in. But nevertheless, morals are not just fashions of the culture. They are tools. And like any tool, they can be evaluated based on how well they do their job.
Not saying that you should find this interesting. But hopefully, this can illuminate why some of us do find it so.