Recent comments in /f/philosophy

Kyocus t1_itxl3qb wrote

I'm on my phone, so I'm not going to link it. We had a discussion about the fallacy fallacy, which I will adamantly contend is stupid till my deathbed.
I agree with you that it's obviously terrible for someone to claim something is false based on faulty argument. I'm also saying that's a red herring, because if the only thing substantiating said claim was the fallacious argument, then there is no longer support to believe such a thing. It's not that I am saying "That's a fallacy, therefore your conclusion is false" I am saying your premise is wrong so I'm agnostic to the claim till it's substantiated, important difference.

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DarkSkyKnight t1_itxjy3h wrote

I really don't know if you're genuinely asking, but linking a possible chain of inspirations through wiki pages is not a rigorous demonstration of their claim.

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goodcleanchristianfu t1_itxj8an wrote

I think it's more like "Some people mistakenly think that declining to defer to other people's opinions is invariably a good thing." It's not valorizing coming to contrarian opinions, but rather failing to recognize that coming to opinions without deference to people who know more than you carries a high risk of being incorrect.

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iiioiia t1_itxj23d wrote

The point is: this very popular claim that ~"the exercise of strict epistemology" would render people immobile is demonstrably false. And while this may seem "trivially true", whether it actually is is a very different matter.

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iiioiia t1_itxhk6s wrote

> You hit the bull's eye. "other forms of knowing" is just a blanket term with nothing defined....

Maybe this is something different than what you're talking about, and it's likely not the best resource on it, but...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology > > > > Nearly all debates in epistemology are in some way related to knowledge. Most generally, "knowledge" is a familiarity, awareness, or understanding of someone or something, which might include facts (propositional knowledge), skills (procedural knowledge), or objects (acquaintance knowledge). Philosophers tend to draw an important distinction between three different senses of "knowing" something: "knowing that" (knowing the truth of propositions), "knowing how" (understanding how to perform certain actions), and "knowing by acquaintance" (directly perceiving an object, being familiar with it, or otherwise coming into contact with it).[16] Epistemology is primarily concerned with the first of these forms of knowledge, propositional knowledge. All three senses of "knowing" can be seen in our ordinary use of the word. In mathematics, you can know that 2 + 2 = 4, but there is also knowing how to add two numbers, and knowing a person (e.g., knowing other persons,[17] or knowing oneself), place (e.g., one's hometown), thing (e.g., cars), or activity (e.g., addition). While these distinctions are not explicit in English, they are explicitly made in other languages, including French, Portuguese, Spanish, Romanian, German and Dutch (although some languages closely related to English have been said to retain these verbs, such as Scots).[note 1] The theoretical interpretation and significance of these linguistic issues remains controversial. > > > > In his paper On Denoting and his later book Problems of Philosophy, Bertrand Russell brought a great deal of attention to the distinction between "knowledge by description" and "knowledge by acquaintance". Gilbert Ryle is similarly credited with bringing more attention to the distinction between knowing how and knowing that in The Concept of Mind. In Personal Knowledge, Michael Polanyi argues for the epistemological relevance of knowledge how and knowledge that; using the example of the act of balance involved in riding a bicycle, he suggests that the theoretical knowledge of the physics involved in maintaining a state of balance cannot substitute for the practical knowledge of how to ride, and that it is important to understand how both are established and grounded. This position is essentially Ryle's, who argued that a failure to acknowledge the distinction between "knowledge that" and "knowledge how" leads to infinite regress.

> ... because there is no other form of actually reliably knowing without empiricism.

I think you may have overlooked a fundamental problem: empiricism may be able to confirm that a proposition is true, but a lack of confirmation does not cause something that is true in fact to be false - it can certainly cause it to appear that way, but that's a different issue. This of course overlooks the "justified" part, but that is on a different level of reality than pure truth.

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Interesting_Mood_124 t1_itxfrr1 wrote

Do you think I don’t know the SEP exists?

At the end of the day, I’m just citing the opinion of an expert in the history of philosophy

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iiioiia t1_itxfknq wrote

>It's just absolute contrived bullshit for (from?) people trying to fuel the anti-scientific circlejerk.

A bit of a counterbalance to the pro-science circlejerk might be good for the memeplex we live in. Or, it may not...who knows, who cares.

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iiioiia t1_itxf2fw wrote

>I am not claiming that all knowledge must have absolute empirical evidence prior to acceptance. That premise would be so inefficient for anyone involved that they would be frozen in a recursive cycle of defining definitions before they can make a single decision.

Luckily, evolution found a solution: belief.

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