Happiness is the way we want to feel. There is a difference between a feeling based on some fundamental lie like being a wirehead vs. something authentic. That is why you are using it as a counter-example to utilitarianism.

There is a difference between belief and knowledge for example. One of which is the truth of the belief.

Happiness cannot just be some mere neuro-transmitter state, or it would fail to account for possible beings that can be happy yet do not use neurotransmitters.

Happiness is the way a being wants to feel. They either are the way they want to feel, the opposite of the way they want to feel, or some distance between these too. This isn't merely about generating hedons.

> I think Science is flawless here.

Can you expand on this a bit?

> The value of Science itself is not in question here.

I believe this to be incorrect, as I am questioning the value of science.

Good riposte; but, does that argument not depend on the claim that our actions ought to be consistent with our values?

There’s also a good discussion to be had there exploring the question of why you/we value reason (and whether we ought to do so), just as an aside.

Oh that's interesting.

My response to that would be - yes, we ought to be reasonable because it is the case that we (or at least, I) value reason.

Yes.

Reason operates by the use of complex series of ‘ought’ statements—standards, biases, criteria, etc.—to discern what is acceptable; the appeal to reason itself rests on the claim that, in our selection of evidence (or just in general), we ought to be reasonable.

Anyone read The Religion of Socrates by Mark Mcpherran?

You have some great points there.

If A is nothing other than B, then A does not add anything to B. If morality is a function of multiple other phenomena or even a complex or simple function of one phenomenon, then it does work.

This does not address the question of why I should be committed to the other's preference. If morality is just what I prefer for myself, it is tautologous that I prefer what I prefer. If morality is that I should advance your preferences, then that is itself a valid preference of mine or a value that needs justifying.

If your argument is that there are two concepts that we did not realize were, in fact, identical, then we should abandon one. Once there was the morning star and the evening star. Today we just call it Venus.

I have no problem with the subjective.

Water has macro properties that we are familiar with. H2O does not automatically conjure up those properties. If "water" were to slowly slip out of use, I don't think there would be much harm. "H2O" would carry the connotations of wet.

The problem is that people assume that morality does more than preference does. It attempts to point to obligations that your preference places on me. To deny that it does this extra work is a value statement. If you just withdraw assent due to lack of evidence, you are skeptical of morality despite accepting preference.

Your last point is the one that loses me the most sleep. If there is no moral realism over and above preference, then how do we prevent society descending into a game of chicken (as it seems to do every now and then on the international level). You could claim that there is personal utility to all sides to agree to the rules of a game. The rules of the game are justified only by the plausibility of all sides agreeing to them.

I thought your point was to show that I need an ought to inform the answer?

As well you should; but, that just proves my point.

> But clearly science has no way to dispute the claims of someone who says “it is inherently good to make others suffer”.

The crux there is that the claim is already non-scientific to begin with. "Good" or "bad" are meaningless terms without context. Good/bad for what and for whom? What might be bad for the slave, might be good for the owner.

You can very much do science on morality, but you can't do it in generic unspecific good or bad terms. That not only doesn't work, it completely overlooks that morality is group behavior, not some overarching absolute value system. What's good for some, is bad for others. And how people treat group members will be completely different to how they treat strangers.

I find your picture of the future very scary.

Even if you could explain every neuron involved in this value of fearing this future, I would still value it. To explain a value is not to justify it.

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We are now in better agreement.

If I go further, I would say that the objective world is just a model living in the subjective world. It is that part that other agents report to be in agreement.

That the objective is part of the subjective does not imply that it is optional. Much of the subjective seems non optional.

This dreadful discussion again. I am all for science'ing morality, but it seems people keep forgetting what science about. Science is first and foremost about describing and predicting the natural world. It's not about telling you what to do. It's about telling you what will happen when you do a thing.

If you want to do science of morality, you have to observe how actual people behave and react in the real world. Forget whatever morality system and thought experiments you heard about in philosophy class, nobody behaves that way. Forget the bible as well, as nobody behave according to that either, even if they claim so. Look at how people actually act. Look at how indoctrination can influence them. Look at how in-group/out-group drastically changes things up. All that stuff.

I’m laughing at the idea that you think your earth human bullshit has anything to do with absolute truth.

I'm laughing at the idea of you playing devil's advocate in a state of maximum suffering and still sticking to the line that's it's a good thing. Your argument has the same character of solipsism - you're going to have to make the right assumption about the existence of consciousness in other people to engage with reality in a meaningful way, but I can't disprove you of thinking you're the only locus of consciousness in the universe.

Pop philosophers are definitely philosophers

Why can't morality be a useful concept if it turns out that its fundamental root is people's subjective preferences?

'Subjective' doesn't need to be a pejorative word. Experience matters, and experience is subjective.

It's possible that when people speak of morality, they are speaking of a coherent concept, that, whether they know it or not, turns out to be subjective preferences (or idealised preferences, which is the preferences someone would have if they had idealised conditions, like full relevant knowledge)

Like it literally is preferences, the way water is H2O. People didn't need to know water is H2O to be able to discuss water or do useful things with it.

Yeah, it doesn't solve the problem of how to aggregate opposing preferences. (I do wonder though how opposing idealised preferences could be, if that gets us anywhere.) But that doesn't mean it's not true. It could be possible that it is unsolvable.

The problem is that you have a presupposition what morality is, and try to fit scientific answers to that, which is the wrong way around. If we don't assume that, science can help with finding out what people consider moral, and find reasons why they think so. This will produce an empirical understanding on morality similar to what Shermer is talking about.

Interesting. I think I can grasp this concept on a rudimentary level. I still think the first sentence was worded super weirdly though 💀

The one in my previous comment.

Well, yeah. You said the question was the opposite, so I'm asking what that is.

The question that underpins the ought/is distinction is "how could you ever get an ought from an is?" Or more concretely, "you can't get an ought from an is."

I disagree, because whatever ought you go with is ultimately going to be determined by underlying facts of the matter.

For instance, your first example - if you decide that you ought to take your shoes off and go jumping in puddles, then that decision is going to be predicated on is statements.

I ought to go jumping in puddles because it is the case that I'd get more enjoyment out of that than the other options, and it is the case that I value my enjoyment more highly than anything else right now.

Then what is the question?