Recent comments in /f/philosophy

[deleted] t1_ix6yz2d wrote

Interesting read but with that said:

‘What’s unique about Chuang-Tzu among the Taoist philosophers is that he was skeptical that we can ever truly judge whether a choice we made was ‘right’ or ‘wrong’.’’

Where would that put Hitler or Stalin? Certainly there must be a point of no return? On a more modern stance, consumerism has driven unethical business practices. Perhaps that has helped the modern world advance in many ways… but does that mean a slave runner is off the hook in the long run? So they shouldn’t care about another living creature “for the greater good” since they feel right about who they are?

And regarding Steinbeck’s interpretation:

“It seems to me that if you or I must choose between two courses of thought or action, we should remember our dying and try so to live that our death brings no pleasure to the world.”

Again where’s the line? We’ve seen plenty of grifters and nasty dictators (e.g. Rush Limbaugh, Leopold II) pass away peacefully and with honors. Why would they care about the world if they didn’t before? If I commit atrocities and die thinking the world will love me for it.. then what else matters?

It’s a perfect world philosophy that I wish we could live in but realistically that’s just not the case.

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Ok_Meat_8322 t1_ix5uh3t wrote

Reply to comment by baileyjn8 in The Solution of Evil by baileyjn8

This is sort of impressive; literally every single sentence in your post is the opposite of what is the case.

The inductive PoE is evidently not "stupid", since hitherto not a single apologist or theologian has been able to refute or rebut it- you yourself failed to even attempt to raise a single substantive objection to it. If it were stupid, you would (hopefully) be able to at least attempt a substantive counter. If neither you nor any professional apologist are unable to rebut a "stupid" argument, what does that say about your intelligence (spoiler; nothing good)?

Nor did you manage to show that "there is a use for evil", in a relevant sense, as it pertains to a tri-omni deity. And indeed, the inductive version of the argument circumvents the single effective counterargument against the traditional deductive version- the logical possibility that God could have a sufficient justification for allowing gratuitous suffering, even if we can't imagine what it could be.

So indeed, this "stupid" argument remains undefeated, and succeeds in establishing the non-existence of a tri-omni deity to a high degree of probability. Oops, eh? Live and learn, I guess.

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VitriolicViolet t1_ix5h5nd wrote

>So we need to be able to differentiate between the those " wants"

fairly easy frankly, maybe not for all but for some.

all i want is land somewhere so i can avoid society as much as humanly possible, ads do not and can not work on someone who refuses to buy or own anything (31 with 3k in total possessions and i buy solely on price per volume/weight).

its a shame most people need to fit in and be like the rest (more people need to know themselves and what they actually want, i do agree)

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VitriolicViolet t1_ix5ggz7 wrote

eh, more like the US vs China.

in the US one has freedom to do pretty much whatever (obviously within some bounds) ie you can become rich enough to dismantle society itself and you are 'free' to do so (Jeff Bezos, Musk, Gates etc ie positive freedom: freedom from external interference).

in China one is free to do whatever they want within the context of larger society ie you can become rich but not enough to dismantle society itself (Jack Ma being punished for doing what Gates and Bezos did: vertical integration to the point of being able to effectively blackmail the nation ie negative freedom).

there is no absolute freedom or even a framework for it (even Anarchy has rules just no centralised authority) outside nature.

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Buderus69 t1_ix5ag2v wrote

I will try to make a short example for a bigger thought pattern: imagine nihilism combined with the donkey paradox.

If you figure that existence is meaningless, in a sense that nothing has inherently any value, and the only way to give something subjective meaning is by choosing for it to have meaning, yet since every possibility to choose is equally meaningless you suddenly can't set yourself to choose any direction.

Like the donkey that can't choose if it wants to squelch it's thirst first or eat the hay and then starves to death, you are stuck in an endless void of not making any sensible choice for either "decision tree" to give anything meaning, and in such deteriorate into a mere observer, someone that does not participate in life and can do nothing else than be.

Trying to escape this would be meaningless, as we stated before one would find no value in trying to escape it, the baseline would not change.

Having come to such a conclusion would make it difficult if not impropable for one to get out of again, choice of improving perspective would be futile. One would have "thought" themselve into a figurative pigeon-hole.

This is just one example, there are (philosophical) thoughts that can possibly be harmful and permanently altering for a mind, like an abstract parasite that latches on and can't be removed, created by mere logic. And only a very specific set of information might help them out of this, which might be questionable if they ever find this 'key' in their lifetime, possibly being stuck with this thought-pattern till the end of their life (which in our example is even questionable if this person would even seek out such information).

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Clementea t1_ix4wvrx wrote

> It's only the experience of free will (what we mean by free will)

Ugh...Why are you saying what's inside the () as the same thing as you previously said?

> While actual freedom sets the boundaries of our moral community (members must be free and moral rules are limited to those we can freely obey)

What does that even mean? How does freedom sets boundaries of moral community? And how does what is inside the bracket even explains it? Yes Moral Rules are limited to those we can freely obey, even if that is not always the case. But how does it sets boundaries of moral community, how does freedom sets it.

You have the freedom to set boundaries, doesn't mean freedom itself sets it. How does that make sense?

> Conscious freedom (or as philosophers may call it, autonomy) is acting in accordance with our higher order principles. For social contract purposes, this means that our conscious selves would create universal moral rules based on the principles of freedom and reason. Our consciously free selves create and consent to the social contract.

Hence our conscious selves creates boundaries...Which we have the freedom to create.

I am not saying you can't differentiate them, it's just seemingly pointless to do so. And what you said here doesn't seems to actually support your point from my view.

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contractualist OP t1_ix4o113 wrote

Our actually free selves wouldn't create our moral rules, its only a descriptive fact that we experience free will (and this is what we mean when we talk about free will) and its this experience that gives us moral responsibility. It's freedom in the broad sense.

Our consciously free selves is the self that acts in accordance with its higher order principles by reflecting on itself and its actions (or philosophical autonomy). And its this free self that creates our moral rules.

So actual freedom is just possessing free will and conscious freedom is acting in accordance with principles and consequently, the ability to create moral laws.

I'll be discussing these ideas more in future posts if you are interested, but let me know if you'd like me to clarify anything or if there's something I should talk about going forward.

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contractualist OP t1_ix4nepl wrote

Actual freedom is a descriptive fact. It's only the experience of free will (what we mean by free will), or our actual selves. While actual freedom sets the boundaries of our moral community (members must be free and moral rules are limited to those we can freely obey) our actual free selves aren't parties to the social contract.

Conscious freedom (or as philosophers may call it, autonomy) is acting in accordance with our higher order principles. For social contract purposes, this means that our conscious selves would create universal moral rules based on the principles of freedom and reason. Our consciously free selves create and consent to the social contract.

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SuperSirVexSmasher t1_ix4kew9 wrote

The following assumes pantheism is true.

Imagine, if God is present in all things could the symphony of life actually be an opportunity for God to judge and reconstitute itself? The idea of hell can be understood as being apart from the presence of God, like the whole of God cast you, a piece of God, out. I find this very interesting. I guess a maximally great being can't be maximally great if it needs to be reconstituted or changed, though, right?

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eliyah23rd t1_ix4aeqh wrote

Not quite clear what specific issue you are getting at here. It might come to me with more reflection, but I'll give my best answer for now.

I am not arguing that my current values are necessarily selfish. They might not even be for the purpose of "thriving". They are what they are regardless of how these values came to be. These values may be sacred to me and I would lay down my life for them. Yes, a researcher might identify a causal pathway that included the search for meaning or the pressure of my parental context. I might even be aware and accept the findings of the research. However, regardless of cause, the sacred remains sacred and may take precedence over any thriving.

So what would be the agenda of my prescriptive research?

  1. To identify the structure of the values I do have. For example, to highlight the fact that there is usually a multiplicity of values that could easily conflict in practice. Or to highlight that consistency and universalism are some of my goals.
  2. To figure out ways multiple people, each with their own and differing goals can work together.

For both these goals the prescriptive and descriptive researchers must collaborate. Or, at least, the descriptive researcher has much to teach the prescriptive practitioner.

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MacinTez t1_ix48s1c wrote

I’m reading it again as I message you! It’s really good! The chair part was the one that I saved to my notes on my initial reading before I even commented… Liberty From and Liberty To along with the two types of freedom you spoke upon should definitely be explored more. I even bookmarked the post. Reading it today after my initial reading yesterday? It flows MUCH better. Took me a min to match my reading cadence to your writing cadence but otherwise it’s good!

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eliyah23rd t1_ix48b3j wrote

I know that I'm responding to your post from three days ago but I've been thinking a lot about our discussion.

In the light of your response, I think the categorical-hypothetical distinction is not sufficient. The pressure that one person exerts on the other (partner) is to accept a categorical. Since this pressure may be a direct appeal to a non-linguistic "irrational" motivator, it may not be saying explicitly "IF you want to partner THEN you must seek X". For example the parent just encourages "seek X" even though the unwritten motivator is that the child desires to align with the parent.

However, this still leaves the analysis in the realm of the descriptive. The researcher identifies these pressures between partners.

But when I switch out of the role of observer to the rational subjective, I am not considering the observed objects. I ask only whether my partner has any hypothetical suggestions for me given the goals I already have. I reject any attempt to request the categorical (without a justifying hypothetical) as manipulation. As a rational actor I still have no reason I "should" accept a new categorical or modify the goals I already have.

The idea that I should accept any categorical because it has in the past been the cause of the current state of affairs, holds no appeal for me. That is the naturalistic fallacy.

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contractualist OP t1_ix47fwu wrote

Actual freedom: the sensation/experience of freedom. Its what we mean when we say free will

Conscious freedom: acting so as to live up to our higher-order principles. We are free from the constraints that prevent us from acting according to our ideals. This is obeying the law that we ourselves would legislate (a Kantian idea of freedom).

These definitions are internal, rather than external, like liberty.

These definitions are useful since I've read the term "freedom" being used in both meanings, which is confusing.

However, let me know if you have any criticisms. I'd be happy to respond.

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contractualist OP t1_ix46ny3 wrote

I discuss my views on free will here. Free will exists as a phenological experience and it shapes the boundaries of our moral universe. If free will is an illusion, then everything must be an illusion. So long as we can say our perceptions of the world exist, free will exists.

If you have any criticisms, I'd be happy to hear them and address them in future posts.

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