I don’t see why there needs to be any sort of direct continuity. We have no real reason to say consciousness can’t stop and restart- although no one can experience it to this extent without the kind of tech we’re talking about, we can still extrapolate from things like sleep and anesthesia.

I think of it like a timeline. The new body is the same “you” if its “start” can connect to the end of the “line” of your old body, even if there’s a time gap. With a “branch,” however, the old “line” still ends entirely, with the “branch” continuing as a separate person.

I know this is a little hard to put into words, I might try and create a visual representation- though you’ll have to bear with my poor art skills if I do.

Okay, the onus is on you how. Sounds like magic. If I had no taste at all, all my life. And you would tell me the stuff we put in your mouth "tastes liie something".. I wouldn't even be able to comprehend what this taste sense is you speak of.

So how you'd conclude from looking at a physical process "Oh, gee that must feel like someting from the inside" without knowing about what it's like sounds like magic to me.

There'd be a lot of interesting things to conclude if a non-sentient intelligent entity would observe biological life. Complex self-dissipating systems, negentropy...etc., but subjective experience? How? On what basis?

Ever read Bisson's "They're Made out of Meat"? That, only waaaay weirder it'd be for that entity to listen to this "inner feel" we have.

I guess soo, in respect to how Chalmers defines the hard problem I’m an illusionist.

I think you die regardless in that last scenario. I get what you are saying but that second mind was always going to branch off. As long as the continuation is physically separate then it’s not really you. Let’s say that technology allows us to copy all the memories from one person perfectly and you could create an artificial biological brain that you could integrate into your own consciousness. Now let’s say after you add this new brain power you can install a copy of your memories from your old brain drive to your new additional brain drive, and moving forward all new memories are encoded simultaneously in both brains. Then as your original brain deteriorates the new brain picks up the slack. Lots of problems here, mainly making sure new brain is structured identically to old brain, syncing brains without changing power and personality, the syncing tech itself. But let’s say it all is solved and as your body and mind dies you eventually find yourself in your new brain and the new brain is then linked to a new clone of you or a synthetic body or whatever. I think that’s the only way to maintain self.

"Where do babies come from?" It is a different physical matter. I'm talking about energetic consciousness. Adults are taught to focus on materiality. Children live in a much more fluid attitude.

I think it would.

I mean, there are other forms of unconsciousness besides sleep, too. If someone’s brain completely shut down due to some severe injury, but then they miraculously recovered, no one would question whether they were still them.

In the end, our consciousness is an emergent phenomenon caused by the pattern of neurons that expresses our unique mind. As long as that pattern is preserved, I argue the persistent “self” is too.

Now, the natural follow-up is, what if you create the “clone” BEFORE destroying the original? In that case, it’s dying, because the “clone” has had time to “branch off”, so to speak. It’s become its own person, similar to, but separate from, you.

Thanks, this was helpful.

The finite attribute of life is exactly what makes it fun. Gods must be top procrastinators.

It’s the difference between sleep mode and turning off the power I think. Also if we upload our minds to a simulated consciousness we create a new mind and the old still dies. But what if our minds are linked to the hardware and is incorporated into our biological minds? If we begin to shut down our biological brains while allowing the mechanical mind to pick up the slack, without interruption, aren’t we just the same mind now residing somewhere else?

Thank you!

It's is of course arcbitecturally completely different than my brain.....

From "input isn ot experience" it doesn't follow that there can't be any experience without input. I am simply saying not all forms of input result in subjective experience.

!RemindMe 6 hours

This is awesome! Thanks for sharing!

Mentioning elechtrochemical activity and the God helmet has nothint to do with the point. You are projecting magical views onto people and tilting at windmills. So we're talking past each other.

>People born deaf have some compensatory mechanisms like better detection of vibrations... but you're stretching at this point.

They have input into their brains. They can understand input they don't have using input they do have.

>Input is not experience.

Of course it is. There can be no experience without input.

>I can build a simple raspberry Pi robot with accentuators and its simple processing doesn't mean it necessarily has subjective experience unless you subscrive to some form of panpsychism.

It has input and that input is in fact experience for the processor. It detects the electricity which then results in other electrochemical reactions.

This is no different than your brain.

>Chalmers's arguments are systematic and explorative

I disagree. They are contrived and designed carefully to try and provide some sort of a backing for his already held conclusions.

>And if it's not apparent to you, then make an argument how subjective experience can be inferred without having it.

I have multiple times.

Your experiences are merely electrochemical activity taking place in your body. They can be measured and then mechanically stimulated to make you feel things.

>That would be beyond Nobel-level stuff.

It's banal and has been done thousands of times. You can literally make people believe in god and then disbelieve by stimulating their brains.

Chalmers's arguments are systematic and explorative. Sorry, can't help you further since he bores you and your convinxed of some caricarure of him.

And if it's not apparent to you, then make an argument how subjective experience can be inferred without having it. I don't think there is one. That would be beyond Nobel-level stuff.

People born deaf have some compensatory mechanisms like better detection of vibrations... but you're stretching at this point.

Yes, the relation between intelligence and consciousness is an open problem. Input sure. Input is not experience. That is nonsense. I can build a simple raspberry Pi robot with accentuators and its simple processing doesn't mean it necessarily has subjective experience unless you subscrive to some form of panpsychism. I don't that flies.

>Because consiousness is a crucial phenomenon and apparently you can't know of it unless you get to experience it.

Why did you put the word "apparently" in there. Is this really apparent? It's not apparent to me at all.

>I suggest you read the meta-problem by Chalmers. If it doesn't interest you, then I guess it doesn'

Chalmers bores me to tears. His arguments are all just attempts to justify his already held beliefs no different than any christian who is making arguments for god.

>You said as an observer you don't know... so I mentioned cojoined twins as an example that in principle we can know.

I don't get it. How is this applicable?

>An observer who doesn't know pain or subjective experience can just note you are making a lot of noise.

In response to particular stimuli. Also other physiological reactions.

>You can tell them you're in pain - how could they ever understand what thst is?

Same way that you do. Your perception of pain is merely electrochemical reactions happening inside of your body. That being could measure these and conclude you are in pain.

My post and a whole body of work covers why it's worthy of consideration. Because consiousness is a crucial phenomenon and apparently you can't know of it unless you get to experience it. That's pretty interesting. I suggest you read the meta-problem by Chalmers. If it doesn't interest you, then I guess it doesn't.

You said as an observer you don't know... so I mentioned cojoined twins as an example that in principle we can know.

>The point is that it's unclear why the processes in our bodies have to feel like anything since descriptively they perform their function.

Again, what does this even mean?

>And it's conceivable an entity has intelligence but no subjective experience.

I am not sure if that's possible. I don't think you can gain or enhance intelligence without input of any sort and input is experience.

>So you can explain what strawberry tastes like till you're blue in the face. It doesn't grasp the concept of taste.

I think it could. Blind people have concepts of seeing, deaf people have concepts of hearing.

>The point is that it's unclear why the processes in our bodies have to feel like anything since descriptively they perform their function.

Why is that a point worthy of consideration?

I also don't see what the conjoined twins has anything to do with this.

Why? As living animals it's our prime directive to stay alive even if it's eventually a losing battle. What kind of enlightenment do you think we'll achieve by going against our nature? I suspect all we get out of it is the possibility of suicidal ideation.

There are variations on the zombie that are a bit more clever. The point is that it's unclear why the processes in our bodies have to feel like anything since descriptively they perform their function.

Cojoined twins exist. See Krista and Tatiana Hogan. So not knowing is an interfacing issue.