Recent comments in /f/philosophy

TheStateOfException OP t1_iztblw6 wrote

Submission Statement:

On the 31st of October 1958, a middle-aged Russian refugee delivered his inaugural Oxford lecture. Today, that lecture is still read by students of political philosophy. It's called Two Concepts of Liberty. Berlin used the lecture to condense much of what he had learned about human nature from his rather remarkable upbringing. His family first had to flee revolutionary Russia, then dodge Hitler. Berlin has a famous line in the lecture:

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>[...] philosophical concepts nurtured in the stillness of a professor's study could destroy a civilisation.

This article analyses the relevance of the idea for our own time, drawing links to the current culture wars and the importance of storytelling.

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BernardJOrtcutt t1_izt87db wrote

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BernardJOrtcutt t1_izt83h7 wrote

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contractualist OP t1_izt1njz wrote

I take the values of reason and freedom as a given. I don't question those values, only recognize that they are implied in the skeptic's question. Morality derives as a consequence of those values. So if someone said they valued reason and X, then they must value X generally. Otherwise they'd run afoul of valuing reason.

What value we choose to impose on something is always subjective, it comes internally. There is no "value" within the material of a thing. There's only our imposition of value.

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timbgray t1_izszmrv wrote

Ok,I’ll go even farther, value is only relevant at the margin. The vale of something is based on the consequence of having one unit more or one unit less, and this will vary according to circumstances.

Oxygen is of value, but the difference in value from someone who doesn’t have enough, and for someone who has never experienced scarcity is such that you don’t get much traction from asserting, albeit truthfully, that oxygen is valuable.

Once you include my feelings as a source or metric of value, you end up on a very slippery slope.

Which ties back to my finger painting. If I lost it on the street and it was found by a street cleaner, or anyone for that matter, how much value would they attribute to the actual finger painting. I think you conflate the value attributed to the physical object vs the value that some others might, or might not, attribute to my subjective sense of loss.

But I’m curious, if the quote I referenced is false, does the argument fall?

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timbgray t1_izssqw0 wrote

I’ll only respond to one quote: “If the skeptic says his X is valuable, then according to reason, X is valuable among others.”

Clearly false. I have a finger painting I did as a 3 year old (and now have no living relatives), that finger is valuable to me but no one else. Don’t know what this does to the basic argument proposed, but caused me to lose interest.

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TheCultureCitizen t1_izsrw5e wrote

>
> > > > He claims the materialist position is that conscious activity is directly correlated to the amount of neural activity. I don't think any actually says or believes that, so it's a strawman.

That's not true, proponents of IIT propose exactly that, or at least heavily hint at it, to them the richness of conscious experience is directly correlated with the amount of "integrated information", and it's not really an unresonable leap to assume more neural activity would lead to more integrated information, so no it's actually not true that physicalists don't believe this.

And again, if you don't believe it to be so you're supposed to show a concrete competing theory, not just gesture vaguely at a potential future theory. You don't really have much to stand on yet you keep pretending like you've basically figured it out.

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contractualist OP t1_izsm516 wrote

Summary: freedom + reason = morality. The basis of normativity is inherently free individuals discovering reasonable justifications for restrictions on freedom. Asking "why should I be moral?” already presupposes (in the question itself) the values of freedom and reason, as well as reason’s priority over freedom.

Since the questioner values freedom, but recognized reason as an authority over freedom, the questioner must recognize and value the freedom of others, having no justification to do otherwise. The questioner has no reasonable basis to value only his own freedom, given that he possesses the same freedom as others. Any differentiation would therefore be arbitrary and would violate his own valuing of reason.

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Nameless1995 t1_izsgrc4 wrote

Chalmers himself ride in-between a form of information-dualism position and panpsychism/panprotopsychism. He tends to think any formal functional-organization of a relevant kind (no matter at which level of abstraction?) would have a corresponding consciousness (based on his dancing qualia/fading qualia thought experiments). So he find it plausible that artificial machines can be conscious.

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InTheEndEntropyWins t1_izsfmdr wrote

Yep, I do find it a strange position to take. I think he even said something like he could imagine that consciousness could be computational in nature.

I personally think his views have evolved but since he is famous for the hard problem, he hasn't really been that explicit about how his views have changed.

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ConsciousLiterature t1_izrv5ue wrote

>I suppose that's fair enough, but personally I'd say there's a tacit assumption in any thought experiment that causality is 'reset' and the hypothetical world plays out according to whatever has been changed in the thought experiment to begin with. In which case these p-zombies wouldn't believe they have qualia.

But that makes no sense. That premise begs the question and can't possibly lead to any kind of rational conclusion.

>What magical machine is this that records my qualia?

There are several variety of brain scanning devices. Surely you know this.

> You can measure my brain activity all you want but that's not the same thing.

Why not? They are exactly the same thing. You can even watch it and say to yourself "so that's what me experiencing the redness of red looks like".

> Neural correlates of consciousness are not consciousness.

That seems like an outrageous claim and will need to be backed up by some evidence.

>The insanity here is the inability to understand what I'm talking about when I refer to the most fundamental aspect of human existence.

I suspect this is because you yourself don't really know and can't put it into precise terms. You are holding on to a vague notion so it's no possible for you to explain it to anybody with clarity.

> My only options are to believe that physicalism has resulted in some sort of collective self-denying delusion (a la Daniel Dennett) or that philosophical zombies actually exist, are among us, and are debating philosophy of mind with us. I can't tell which one I prefer.

I think if you tried hard enough you'd be able to come up other options.

>Because I'm sure you would've told me by now if you were lmao

What makes you so sure of that?

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NukePlayo t1_izrstev wrote

free will in its most classical sense means "the possibility to have done otherwise". I may have a mind and consciousness, but I will have certain inclinations towards certain actions, based on my brain chemistry and as a reaction to other actions etc. to say that I could've done otherwise in the past would mean that the state of my mind or the circumstances would have had to be different, which is simply not possible and therefore I couldn't have done otherwise. it would be preposterous to say that a drug addict has control over his volition. in my opinion the best argument for free will/moral responsibility (that I know about) is that of the Frankfurt cases. these cases proposed by Harry Frankfurt are counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) which I personally think are quite strong. but this still does not try to prove free will in a classical libertarian sense because it still denies being able to have done otherwise. so I don't think we can reduce the concept of free will to having a conscious mind still might not have complete agency.

I don't know if this was very cogent or not sorry I'm not rly the most knowledgeable on this I only know a few things I've heard of so far

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