Recent comments in /f/philosophy
strawsunn t1_iztdeht wrote
Reply to comment by timbgray in Why You Should Be Moral (answering Prichard's dilemma) by contractualist
Someone who values you could find value in your macaroni art.
sunnbeta t1_iztc9js wrote
Reply to comment by timbgray in Why You Should Be Moral (answering Prichard's dilemma) by contractualist
Couldn’t that just be read that their own sentimental items are valuable to them?
TheStateOfException OP t1_iztblw6 wrote
Submission Statement:
On the 31st of October 1958, a middle-aged Russian refugee delivered his inaugural Oxford lecture. Today, that lecture is still read by students of political philosophy. It's called Two Concepts of Liberty. Berlin used the lecture to condense much of what he had learned about human nature from his rather remarkable upbringing. His family first had to flee revolutionary Russia, then dodge Hitler. Berlin has a famous line in the lecture:
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>[...] philosophical concepts nurtured in the stillness of a professor's study could destroy a civilisation.
This article analyses the relevance of the idea for our own time, drawing links to the current culture wars and the importance of storytelling.
BernardJOrtcutt t1_izt87db wrote
Reply to comment by [deleted] in AI could have 20% chance of sentience in 10 years, says philosopher David Chalmers by hackinthebochs
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BernardJOrtcutt t1_izt83h7 wrote
Reply to comment by [deleted] in AI could have 20% chance of sentience in 10 years, says philosopher David Chalmers by hackinthebochs
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-off-white t1_izt3mu8 wrote
Reply to AI could have 20% chance of sentience in 10 years, says philosopher David Chalmers by hackinthebochs
…wouldn’t that entitle an AI to have some sort of an ego? For them to understand emotions based off the internet, that would show more bad than good….I don’t think we will see a day where we have a true AI that has gained human ego, feelings, and creativity.
__corpse_ t1_izt2x9g wrote
Reply to AI could have 20% chance of sentience in 10 years, says philosopher David Chalmers by hackinthebochs
If that really happens, what do u think, will it lead to our downfall or will it lead to our extraordinary evolution??
Personally, I would like to see it happening, I want to know to what limits our society can go, both emotionally and technologically.
contractualist OP t1_izt1njz wrote
Reply to comment by timbgray in Why You Should Be Moral (answering Prichard's dilemma) by contractualist
I take the values of reason and freedom as a given. I don't question those values, only recognize that they are implied in the skeptic's question. Morality derives as a consequence of those values. So if someone said they valued reason and X, then they must value X generally. Otherwise they'd run afoul of valuing reason.
What value we choose to impose on something is always subjective, it comes internally. There is no "value" within the material of a thing. There's only our imposition of value.
Bozobot t1_izt0wkh wrote
Reply to comment by timbgray in Why You Should Be Moral (answering Prichard's dilemma) by contractualist
Oxygen isn’t valuable in itself. It’s the living that we value. OP is talking about things that we value for their own sake.
timbgray t1_izszmrv wrote
Reply to comment by contractualist in Why You Should Be Moral (answering Prichard's dilemma) by contractualist
Ok,I’ll go even farther, value is only relevant at the margin. The vale of something is based on the consequence of having one unit more or one unit less, and this will vary according to circumstances.
Oxygen is of value, but the difference in value from someone who doesn’t have enough, and for someone who has never experienced scarcity is such that you don’t get much traction from asserting, albeit truthfully, that oxygen is valuable.
Once you include my feelings as a source or metric of value, you end up on a very slippery slope.
Which ties back to my finger painting. If I lost it on the street and it was found by a street cleaner, or anyone for that matter, how much value would they attribute to the actual finger painting. I think you conflate the value attributed to the physical object vs the value that some others might, or might not, attribute to my subjective sense of loss.
But I’m curious, if the quote I referenced is false, does the argument fall?
contractualist OP t1_izsve8i wrote
Reply to comment by timbgray in Why You Should Be Moral (answering Prichard's dilemma) by contractualist
If someone were to say that a valued sentimental value, they wouldn’t be acting according to that value if they ripped up that painting. The painting has sentimental value, regardless of who imposes that value onto it.
timbgray t1_izsu57t wrote
Reply to comment by contractualist in Why You Should Be Moral (answering Prichard's dilemma) by contractualist
Ok but it is not “valuable among others”.
contractualist OP t1_izstq3h wrote
Reply to comment by timbgray in Why You Should Be Moral (answering Prichard's dilemma) by contractualist
Some things I have have sentimental value. They have property X. Things you have also have sentimental value, the same property X. I can say that I don’t value your painting as much as you do. But I cannot say that the painting lacks sentimental value (clearly it does to you).
timbgray t1_izssqw0 wrote
I’ll only respond to one quote: “If the skeptic says his X is valuable, then according to reason, X is valuable among others.”
Clearly false. I have a finger painting I did as a 3 year old (and now have no living relatives), that finger is valuable to me but no one else. Don’t know what this does to the basic argument proposed, but caused me to lose interest.
TheCultureCitizen t1_izsrw5e wrote
Reply to comment by InTheEndEntropyWins in The world and other minds | Idealism leads to solipsism. Coherentism, rather than foundationalism, has better chance of reconciling solipsism with the apparent existence of other minds. by IAI_Admin
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> He claims the materialist position is that conscious activity is directly correlated to the amount of neural activity. I don't think any actually says or believes that, so it's a strawman.
That's not true, proponents of IIT propose exactly that, or at least heavily hint at it, to them the richness of conscious experience is directly correlated with the amount of "integrated information", and it's not really an unresonable leap to assume more neural activity would lead to more integrated information, so no it's actually not true that physicalists don't believe this.
And again, if you don't believe it to be so you're supposed to show a concrete competing theory, not just gesture vaguely at a potential future theory. You don't really have much to stand on yet you keep pretending like you've basically figured it out.
contractualist OP t1_izsm516 wrote
Summary: freedom + reason = morality. The basis of normativity is inherently free individuals discovering reasonable justifications for restrictions on freedom. Asking "why should I be moral?” already presupposes (in the question itself) the values of freedom and reason, as well as reason’s priority over freedom.
Since the questioner values freedom, but recognized reason as an authority over freedom, the questioner must recognize and value the freedom of others, having no justification to do otherwise. The questioner has no reasonable basis to value only his own freedom, given that he possesses the same freedom as others. Any differentiation would therefore be arbitrary and would violate his own valuing of reason.
Nameless1995 t1_izsgrc4 wrote
Reply to comment by JHogg11 in AI could have 20% chance of sentience in 10 years, says philosopher David Chalmers by hackinthebochs
Chalmers himself ride in-between a form of information-dualism position and panpsychism/panprotopsychism. He tends to think any formal functional-organization of a relevant kind (no matter at which level of abstraction?) would have a corresponding consciousness (based on his dancing qualia/fading qualia thought experiments). So he find it plausible that artificial machines can be conscious.
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_izsfmdr wrote
Reply to comment by JHogg11 in AI could have 20% chance of sentience in 10 years, says philosopher David Chalmers by hackinthebochs
Yep, I do find it a strange position to take. I think he even said something like he could imagine that consciousness could be computational in nature.
I personally think his views have evolved but since he is famous for the hard problem, he hasn't really been that explicit about how his views have changed.
iiioiia t1_izs8n41 wrote
Reply to comment by corpus-luteum in Understanding games may hold the secret to living the good life, says philosopher by grh55
New solutions to old games can be discovered, and also new games can be invented.
MarkAmsterdamxxx t1_izs6twg wrote
Reply to AI could have 20% chance of sentience in 10 years, says philosopher David Chalmers by hackinthebochs
If I read AI as made of silicon I disagree, but if it is AI from a synthesis of silicon and biological material I would give it a chance. But not within 10 years. Maybe a 100.
[deleted] t1_izs3dnu wrote
Reply to AI could have 20% chance of sentience in 10 years, says philosopher David Chalmers by hackinthebochs
!remind me 10 years
[deleted] t1_izrvbra wrote
Reply to comment by [deleted] in AI could have 20% chance of sentience in 10 years, says philosopher David Chalmers by hackinthebochs
[removed]
ConsciousLiterature t1_izrv5ue wrote
Reply to comment by Mustelafan in The hard problem of metaphysics: figuring out if other phenomena exist in our universe that like consciousness require we bear a specific metaphysical relation to them - i.e. you can't know of consciousness without being conscious. by Gmroo
>I suppose that's fair enough, but personally I'd say there's a tacit assumption in any thought experiment that causality is 'reset' and the hypothetical world plays out according to whatever has been changed in the thought experiment to begin with. In which case these p-zombies wouldn't believe they have qualia.
But that makes no sense. That premise begs the question and can't possibly lead to any kind of rational conclusion.
>What magical machine is this that records my qualia?
There are several variety of brain scanning devices. Surely you know this.
> You can measure my brain activity all you want but that's not the same thing.
Why not? They are exactly the same thing. You can even watch it and say to yourself "so that's what me experiencing the redness of red looks like".
> Neural correlates of consciousness are not consciousness.
That seems like an outrageous claim and will need to be backed up by some evidence.
>The insanity here is the inability to understand what I'm talking about when I refer to the most fundamental aspect of human existence.
I suspect this is because you yourself don't really know and can't put it into precise terms. You are holding on to a vague notion so it's no possible for you to explain it to anybody with clarity.
> My only options are to believe that physicalism has resulted in some sort of collective self-denying delusion (a la Daniel Dennett) or that philosophical zombies actually exist, are among us, and are debating philosophy of mind with us. I can't tell which one I prefer.
I think if you tried hard enough you'd be able to come up other options.
>Because I'm sure you would've told me by now if you were lmao
What makes you so sure of that?
NukePlayo t1_izrstev wrote
Reply to comment by ridgecoyote in /r/philosophy Open Discussion Thread | December 05, 2022 by BernardJOrtcutt
free will in its most classical sense means "the possibility to have done otherwise". I may have a mind and consciousness, but I will have certain inclinations towards certain actions, based on my brain chemistry and as a reaction to other actions etc. to say that I could've done otherwise in the past would mean that the state of my mind or the circumstances would have had to be different, which is simply not possible and therefore I couldn't have done otherwise. it would be preposterous to say that a drug addict has control over his volition. in my opinion the best argument for free will/moral responsibility (that I know about) is that of the Frankfurt cases. these cases proposed by Harry Frankfurt are counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) which I personally think are quite strong. but this still does not try to prove free will in a classical libertarian sense because it still denies being able to have done otherwise. so I don't think we can reduce the concept of free will to having a conscious mind still might not have complete agency.
I don't know if this was very cogent or not sorry I'm not rly the most knowledgeable on this I only know a few things I've heard of so far
strawsunn t1_iztdjlh wrote
Reply to comment by strawsunn in Why You Should Be Moral (answering Prichard's dilemma) by contractualist
In fact, I will be the one to say, I value your art because you made it at a time in your life when your thoughts were pure and innocent. I find art like that extremely valuable. :)