>Your entire post uses ignorance of physics as a bludgeon.

Nah. It is an effort to explain to people who understand physics but little else why other peope, who don't understand physics, understand more than they do.

>No, it is precisely the right word. Which you’d know if you knew enough about physics to have this conversation.

You're mistaking what is conventional within physics for what is meaningful in real life. "System" is the wrong word for a single substance, even one so profoundly important to physicists as Bose-Einstein condensates.

>Condensed matter physics is an application of quantum mechanics used to model properties of macroscopic systems.

It is used to model one very specific and particular (pun intended) kind of quantum system, which is really important because that specific "condensed matter" is a macroscopic substance, unlike most quantum systems, which are sub-atomic, so small that even using the contrast macro/microscopic is actually weird.

>I used it as an example of how macroscopic things absolutely do demonstrate quantum mechanical properties,

Nobody disputes that deterministic objects "demonstrate quantum mechanical properties"; as far as I know, they do so simply by existing. The issue being address here is how, and whether that is known with enough detail and accuracy in a wide enough variety of instances to be considered important outside of the singular domain of physics. Most directly observable ("macroscopic") systems don't demonstrate quantum mechanical properties over and above classical mechanical properties. So the use of one example of a "macroscopic thing" demonstrating quantum properties (which, as far as I know, aren't observable as distinct from conventional properties in BEC without special equipment and in highly restricted circumstances) really doesn't have the weight you think it would, in this discussion.

> I never said that it is “all of physics,” but that’s a nice strawman.

Not a strawman, just an example of what it would take to justify saying that QM effects "the macro world" of everyday objects.

>Semantics

AKA language. AKA discussion. AKA the real world.

>I’m not talking about notation,

Semantics.

>The point is that in circumstances when hbar is small compared to the relevant scale factors of a system, quantum mechanics turns into classical mechanics.

A very important issue, in theory. Why is it that you have trouble excepting that proving something in principle to other scientists isn't the same as having an effect on the rest of the world?

>Except I’ve given explicit examples of ways that QM empirically is relevant in macroscopic systems

"Relevant". What a pleasantly useful dragging of the goalposts halfway down the field that is.

I never disputed that QM is relevant in those examples. But despite that, the relevance of those examples is less than you are insisting. At least to the person who made the comment, which we both disagreed with. I just did a better job of it, and I thought I'd be helpful and explain what it is you were doing wrong in that regard.

>But as usual, you simply don’t engage with the parts of my arguments that you don’t know how to address and pretend they never happened.

You have it backwards. The parts I don't engage are either trivial or accurate. The sections of your comments I directly address are mostly just the more illustrative mistakes in your reasoning.

>Well now you just seem to want to redefine "computer" as a piece of an emergent "computing system",

Not a piece, a purpose. The computer is the logic behind the hardware, not the hardware.

> At what part does this distinction occur?

Distinctions occur when they are made. You can refuse to make the distinction; obviously enough, it was mentioned only to illustrate a point. But regardless of whether it is a common usage of the term, it is easy to grasp (metaphorically, though as impossible to physically grasp as any metaphor) if you try even a little bit to understand the point. It isn't even all that novel. There was a time when "computer" was a career choice, not equipment. The computer is not the appliance, but the function. It may require a process, but it is holistic; the (abstract) computer missing any "part" of the process is no longer a computer at all. In contrast, the appliance without a given chip or a hard drive is still a "computer" in the conventional sense, just not a functioning one.

>Until you clearly define the physical parts of the commonly held definition of compute

LOL. Until you come to grips with the point I was making, that the hardware (or even software) isn't the issue, the computation is, you'll continue to be mystified by the fact that anything that computes is a computer, and it is not necessary for it to be the "macro" device you are thinking of when you use the term, and you'll be unable to recognize the significance of your error when it comes to the relationship between QM and deterministic objects. It is easy to assume and believe that our current QM models are sufficient for explaining how and why deterministic objects we directly interact with emerge from the quantum mechanics we've already discovered, and nothing more, just as it is easy to assume the word "computer" only refers to the electronic appliances you are familiar with. But until you do explain how and why the "macro world" emerges from quantum interactions, in each and every detail and every possible instance, you're just testifying to your faith, not reporting a fact. I can't dismiss your assumption that Newtonian (and relativistic) mechanics would certainly emerge from what we already know about quantum interactions as nonsense, because it is not nonsense. It's just arrogance and ignorance. It might not even be an inaccurate belief, but it is still wrong simply because it is a belief rather than actual knowledge.

Let me close by summarizing the distinction between my reasoning and yours, in terms of the quibbles we have with the original comment we've both separately addressed by disagreeing with it:

>>It has nothing to do with the complex macro structures we know as "reality."

Here's your quibble, as you've attested, indicated by emphasis:

>It has nothing to do with the complex macro structures we know as "reality."

I said you overstated your case in your quibbling, and I hope you'll take the trouble to review the thread to see why I said it, and how it was a reasonable criticism. I think it is more important than you realize. In contrast, here's my quibble, again indicated by emphasis, which I also hope will be self-explanatory in making a less overblown and thus stronger case against the original comment:

>It has nothing to do with the complex macro structures we know as "reality."

Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.

>Sure, if you describe "reality" as what humans are capable of perceiving,

I describe "reality" as what humans do percieve, and consider only humans to be capable of perceiving. But I don't limit perception by excluding what we can empirically measure from it. To believe that QM is different from classic physics because it requires more precise measurements to identify it's principles is just like believing that QM is a matter of size rather than scope.

>A computer is undeniably a macro structure.

I accept that challenge. A computing appliance (a generally programmable calculating device) is a macro structure. But the computer which it enmatters is not. It is a system, but it would be the same system if it were implemented with any other structure, regardless of the size. In a very real way, all computers are "quantum devices", because a binary digit is a quantum of information/data, and also because somehow (we know not how!) the electrical mechanisms we use to execute the computer are themselves quantum effects, more so than the physical object is. But of course, the current craze concerning 'equipment which utilizes superpositions for computation' makes that identification of a data processing appliance as "a quantum computer" confusing.

>A computer manipulating the rules of quantum mechanics must have something to do with our macro "reality", even if it is rather inconsequential at this time

It really doesn't, although admittedly the mind boggles at trying to imagine a computing mechanism which does not require deterministic ("macro") components. But your analogy furthers my position, because neither the mathematical manipulations (translations, in mathematical terms) nor the rules of quantum mechanics are bounded by "our" reality, although they are objective so there is a parallel.

In case you didn't notice, I quibbled with the same comment (a reply to my previous comment) that you did. I am not opposed to your conjecture about the necessary relationship between QM theory and the more directly observable universe of objects. I was just picking at a particularly troublesome part of the reasoning you apparently based that conjecture on.

Sorry to have bothered you. Carry on. 😉

>sorta naively think of as “so what” or “what would knowing the answer change for you?”

I can appreciate the "hot take", but it is, indeed, naive. My questions certainly had a similar dispositive character to what you could naturally presume to be dismissive argumentation, but they were sincere and exploratory, not merely rhetorical.

>Reason expanded with intuition?

In my view, which is thoroughly unconventional, intuition and reason are much more closely related than reason and logic, the conventional view that I believe you and that book said about 'genius' are both starting from.

Happy to help, hope to hear more from you.

You are doing an admirable job of recreating the course of philosophical development. I wish I could call it "progress", but this is, I believe, an iconic example which illustrates it is not. Thousands of years before humans discovered the real nature of colors (both as frequencies of electromagnetic radiation differentially effecting the cells in our eyeballs, and as comparative/relative signals processed by our neurological visual systems) Aristotle and other ancient philosophers contemplated the idea or ideal of the conscious experience of color (what today philosophers identify as qualia). But the question of whether "redness" exists 'in and of itself' is more a matter of convention than ascertainable fact. I believe (I'm not rigorously academic so I could be mistaken, and I'm sure I'm not using the "proper" terminology) that the current convention is to say that redness is always applied to something, similar to the idea of size; it is comparative rather than fundamental.

The truth, at least as I see it, is that this epistemic uncertainty is the same in terms of qualia like "redness" and also numbers, but also every other word in every real language. It just becomes most obvious in these two examples, so much so that not even the most neopostmodern of postmodernists can deny that metaphysical uncertainty (whether "red" exists or whether "math" transcends physics or results from it) and epistemic uncertainty (whether "redness" exists or whether "numbers are real") themselves exist (distinct from simple ignorance), and will argue whether they can really be distinguished.

>What do you think condensed matter physics is, if not the application of quantum mechanics to macroscopic systems?

The term "systems" seems a bit of over-reach, in line with your original premise. It may be common for people to assume that quantum mechanics is intrinsically limited to sub-atomic systems, but that isn't important. What is important, for the purposes of this discussion, is that condensed matter physics is a specific sub-domain of physics, rather than all of physics itself, which exemplifies the fact that QM doesn't literally explain how or why classic physics ("Newtonian physics" was the iconic representative) arises from the principles of QM. In theory we "know" it must, but as it has not yet been convincingly demonstrated in general cases, insisting that conjecture is fact is problematic. At least as far as philosophy goes, which is not restricted to even presuming that classic physics accurately describes "the macroscopic world".

>Scientific models aren’t concerned with how or why.

I would dispute half of that. Scientific models are entirely about how, and necessarily unconcerned with why. But the nature of language (capable of absurdity as functional, which logic and mathematical systems are not) makes the distinction itself less certain than scientists and scientificists are capable of addressing.

>In fact, mathematically the only distinction between the two arises entirely from the fact that in classical mechanics [x,p] = 0 and in quantum mechanics [x,p] = ihbar.

I would say that the notation arises from the distinction rather than the other way around. But the direction of the teleology itself is a philosophical matter, not a scientific consideration, because as I said, science is all about how, not about why.

>You’re right that we don’t fully understand the mechanisms by which macroscopic systems lose coherence

Bingo.

>But that doesn’t mean we don’t know that, regardless of those details, quantum mechanical behavior necessarily reduces to classical mechanics in appropriate macroscopic limits

Actually, it genuinely does mean exactly that. While it is not a possibility that science needs to deal with at the moment (though I might wonder why 0 is not the same as ihbar) it is one that must be considered philosophically, lest we assume that science is omniscient by definition.

But of course, and I may be mistaken about this and please enlighten me about your reasoning if I am, I presume you meant classic physics reduce to QM, rather than the other way around, which is what you actually typed. I think the idea that quantum behavior necessarily reduces to Newtonian mechanics is absurd, isn't it?

>We cannot derive the stress tensor for a chair when I’m sat on it using quantum mechanics (which we could do using classical mechanics) because it’s simply much too complex a feat.

I don't mean to sound flippant, but that is an awfully convenient excuse. Which is to say that since you cannot demonstrate that you can perform such a feat, it remains conjecture rather than knowledge, faith rather than fact, a valid supposition but not a foregone conclusion, that it actually can be done.

> But the neat thing about physics and math is that we can often prove things to be true in general more easily that we can actually do something for a specific, complicated case,

And the unfortunate reality about logic (physics and math) is that we can often make presumptuous assumptions without demonstrating their validity in practical cases. "Often", after all, does not mean 'always', and whether the instant case is such an example requires empirical demonstration or else it is simply not convincing, all the more so because of the specifically confounding results that differentiates QM from classic physics.

>This is one such case, where mathematical proofs of the correspondence principle between quantum mechanics and classical mechanics exist.

As I've said all along, your conjecture is true in principle and theoretically. And also as I pointed out, it remains an act of faith to suppose that means it is true in reality.

>My comment has nothing to do with physical realism

Then it, quite arguably, has nothing to do with the discussion, in a way very analogous (or perhaps entirely identical) to whether QM "has nothing to do with" actual reality, but only mathematically models particular systems in scientific laboratories. I don't fault or question your principles, and I realize that discoveries founded on quantum mechanics have provided real results in terms of useful engineering results. But I still insist you are overstating the case of their applicability, since functional utility in restricted examples does not actually prove general accuracy in all instances, even with further theoretical bases to support the belief that QM fully explains why Newtonian physics arises from quantum interactions.

Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.

>Is there a distinction between realness and existence?

Depends. 😉

The question isn't really what makes numbers unreal, but what makes them real. To ask whether numbers "exist" simply explores the issue further rather than indicates a resolution. Are numbers simply functional illusions, or do they (not the numerals we use to identify them, which is a separate order of "exist", but the numbers apart from the quantities we abstract them from) exist 'in and of themselves', and if so, are they more or less real than the quantities, or the minds perceiving them?

Most people are satisfied with ignoring it all as esoteric navel-gazing or psychobabble, and say it is something only incompetent philosophers do to earn a paycheck. They assume that when it comes to non-material (?) things like numbers, being real or existing only reduces to utility, anyway, so why bother caring. Nobody has respect for philosophers, unless they're just mathematicians in disguise, until their pet or their relative dies, and then suddenly everything becomes starkly existential and they want solace from their angst and uncertainty, and even then they don't want philosophers, they just want secular priests.

Sorry for the rant. Thanks for your time. Hope it helps. 🤓

You think this is bad, you should check out r/consciousness. Even disregarding the admitted panpsychists, every discussion highlights and then centers around the "quantum eraser experiment", it seems. But it isn't surprising, since QM and the hard problem are the most vexing issues related to philosophy these days, so it (they, and their potential alignment/conflict) is what people want to talk about. Philosophy is all about explaining and professing world views. And I do believe I prefer the quantum physics posts to the more mundane but equally pointless rehashing of utilitarian ethics posts. And all that's left is esoteric and arcane plumbing of the depths of analytic logical positivism. 😉

>You keep saying that the misconception that observation requires a conscious observer is a common misconception among physicists. I

As a strawman, it is not an entirely inadequate proxy for what I actually said, but it is not what I actually said.

>You are what I would refer to as obtuse.

And you are what I refer to as cantankerous. You're in the wrong subreddit. This is r/philosophy, not r/physics.

>. I am not arguing about the details of language, consciousness, and existential truth. I am merely pointing out that the language [...]

Oops.

>used to describe quantum mechanics is easily misunderstood, and that the specific misconception that quantum mechanics places conscious observation on a pedestal is easily dispelled by clarifying what the words used to talk about quantum mechanics means.

Quantum mechanics is easily misunderstood. Perhaps owing to the fact it cannot be easily (or actually) understood. "If you think you understand quantum mechanics, you don't understand quantum mechanics." The meaning of words is also (supposedly independently) not easily understood, despite the faith one might have in any particular definition or dictionary. So despite the devastation you have wreaked on the strawman argument that I have besmirched the good name of Niels Bohr, the actual issue I am discussing remains, unperturbed.

I don't identify you as a neopostmodernist to "make myself feel better", I do it to accurately describe your position and practices, or at least the intellectual milieu and time period of your reasoning.

The problem is that "clarifying [...] the words used to talk about" any subject, let alone the supremely difficult subjects of QM or consciousness, doesn't actually work as well as you insist it should. Whether 'observation' or 'measurement' or 'interaction' or any other word is used, and no matter how rigorously one attempts to nail down what any of them "mean", the difficulty of understanding or discussing these things does not evaporate, or even lessen, and the effort itself simply compounds the difficulty. Scientists can shut up and calculate, but when they don't, and for everyone else who simply accepts what (current) science provides without further consideration, the nature of meaning, in both words and more generally, makes the difficulty of dealing with the possible correlation, or at least parallel, between the ineffably quantum and the ineffably conscious all the more enticing.

Personally, I don't suffer from this problem, because my philosophy resolves the nature of consciousness more completely than neopostmodern philosophies do. I can understand the parallels between quantum uncertainty and existential uncertainty, and recognize the meaning of those parallels without conflating the subjects. But the problem remains, even for me, when I attempt to discuss these issues with other people, and the more neopostmodernist they are, the more cantankerous they get. You have demonstrated that well, I believe, and I apologize for engaging on this topic with you as an object lesson on principle, since I don't disagree with you at all about how much that strawman deserved the thorough thrashing you've given it.

Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.

Just the thought they are "made of" some other thing is really the issue, in a very ultimate sort of way. Some people truly believe they are 'made of' thought, perception, even consciousness itself. Most people want a more rigorous, scientific kind of approach, but are stymied by the fact they seem to be 'made of' nothing more than probability (or perhaps "strings vibrating in 11 dimensions"). Is energy 'made of' wave functions or are wave functions 'made of 'energy? I propose they (energy and wave functions) are 'made of' and 'make up' the ineffability of being, and it's "turtles all the way down", as if that makes any sense. 😉

By the way, I started a subreddit for discussing things like this outside of r/philosophy and r/consciousness, feel free to visit or post there if you are interested.

Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.

Proving and explaining are only the same thing in a paper or a laboratory; the real world we live in and philosophize about is much more complicated than the scientific field of physics. In this way, the discussion here is very much a microcosm of the issue being discussed, and it is worth noting that your comment is, in a very real way you might not have been aware of when you wrote it, "overly dismissive". 😉

Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.

I'm uncertain if I am more delighted or bemused by the need to try to reign in both sides of this debate that has followed from my comment. The existence of quantum computers would be a lot more coherent (pun intended) of an argument for the idea that extracting the deterministic world of physical objects conforming to classic physics from the principles of quantum mechanics is a 'done deal' if quantum computers were mundane appliances. But the truth is that real-world quantum computers are effectively gigantic super-expensive science experiments, not consumer goods, so the difficulty of wrestling practical power from superpositions, even in the abstract case of computational calculations, seems to support the "QM doesn't describe reality" side of the discussion more than the "QM does describe reality" side, if I can be forgiven for trying to simplify the conflict in that way.

>You can recover all of Newtonian mechanics from quantum mechanics.

I think it is fair to say this is true in principle, but in real terms you are overstating the case, and expressing a profession of faith rather than fact. In general I definitely support your side of the argument, but at this point you seem to be missing the nature of the counter-argument in order to "be right". We know that classic physics relates to, for instance, the collapse of superpositions and entanglement through decoherence into classically deterministic states, yes, but not really how or why. That's just putting words to mathematically described aspects of quantum systems. It doesn't really mean we actually can derive classic physics from QM, explicitly, just that we assume it must be possible theoretically. Your profession of faith in physical realism is scientifically appropriate, but philosophically it is akin to a declaration of omniscience.

The idea thebeatifulseason identified generalizes to solipsism, but not all metaphysical uncertainty goes that far. Ultimately, solipsism itself is merely an instance of a broader category of unfalsifiable theories concerning consciousness. Other examples include simulation theory/brain in a jar, theism, panpsychism, and Last Thursdayism. They are not presumed implicitly false epistemically, although they are typically not worth discussing ontologically. However, this leaves the area of theology, which is to say morality or ethics, not merely theism, the existence and characteristics of God.

In science, an unfalsifiable theory is one that is logically incoherent or unnecessary, to the point it cannot be falsified empirically; it is "not even wrong". (A phrase which means "not even true enough to be incorrect", supposedly a remark made by Richard Feynman when presented with a naive and unfalsifiable hypothesis.) But philosophy is not science, and must confront rather than dismiss theories that cannot be disproven even in principle. In a very important respect science is a part of philosophy: science is all the easy parts of philosophy, the questions that can, in principle, be answered empirically, physics, while philosophy is everything left over, metaphysics.

It doesn't really, but only because I don't know why you are asking it, and the answer doesn't make any difference to what I said. Quantum particles aren't really "composed" of anything, because that term suggests component parts, which is the opposite of what "quanta" means. Quantum particles are just energy, aka the localized affect of decoherent wave functions.

Yeah. "Are numbers real?" is the most intriguing question ever, and if you are satisfied with any answer for it, you don't actually understand it, as far as I'm concerned.

>I’m not arguing that physicists can’t make mistakes or harbor some misconceptions, but negligibly few will make the mistake you’re claiming.

You're building a strawman here. The nature of the issue is broader than just that one word. The metaphysical perspective that results in non-physicists over-interpreting that word does in fact infest the thinking of physicists, as well, in their interpretation if not their scientific efforts.

>Which words, exactly, are you referring to?

The ones I used, which is why I said that. I'll leave it for you to obsess over which ones exactly.

>This year’s Nobel prize has its roots in the very conversations you’re claiming these physicists — the foremost experts of the subject at the time — weren’t qualified to have.

Nah. The prize related to the "shut up and calculate" parts of the science, not their interpretations and conversations.

>This misconception is very easy to dispel simply by having a careful talk about the meaning of words, and that tells me it’s the words that are the main problem.

LOL. Yes, you misunderstand the problem. You are what I refer to as a neopostmodernist. By that I mean that you don't realize that compared to the meaning of words, quantum mechanics is downright trivial. If only something as simple as Bell's Theorem could be used to sort out language, consciousness, and existential truth.

>Is the related to Descartes’ work in philosophy?

That's the trillion dollar question.

Yes, your philosophy professor was trying to explain metaphysical uncertainty. My point was that it isn't actually limited to quantum mechanics. QM just makes it more obvious that it is fascinating and will send you into an existential crisis if you think about it too much. Physicists have the luxury to "shut up and calculate", but philosophers deal with the hard problems.

>“We don’t know where something is until we measure it, but it is somewhere, waiting for us to spot it.”

>QM is not that normal.

Well, I hope you won't mind if I try to interpret what you're trying to say. Before I do that, though, I feel that I should point out that isn't a quotation from me, nor does it adequately characterize what I did say. But I understand why you presumed that you were actually paraphrasing my position, when you weren't.

Accepting the 'location' metaphor you have set up, I don't think "we don't know where something is" but it is "waiting for us to spot it". Quite the opposite; there is either a location, amd we simply look at what is there, or we only measure whatever we spotted, and then try to figure out from that what and where it is. In that way, QM is perfectly normal: it is simply physics. The fact that it provides results that are startlingly unexpected and seem to be more contrary to our intuitions doesn't make that any less true. In fact, it makes it more true, just in a surprising way because we've become so used to believing (falsely) that we understand why physical objects behave the way they do. But let's not forget that all science is, to some degree or other, contrary to our expectations. Intuition led us to believe that heavier objects fall faster than lighter ones. Intuition led us to believe that aether must exist, that the Sun orbited the Earth, and that mice arose from dirty rags. QM is more exceptional because it defies the expectations of conventional physics, not because it is unintuitive. Heck, most people don't quite understand how the speed of light could limit the propagation of gravity, so the fact that entanglement could (theoretically!) allow instantaneous information transfer is only notable because scientists previously (but only recently) insisted that instantaneous information transfer was impossible, not because it is "unintuitive".

>It’s as if Nature waits to decide where a particle is until we ask.

You just repeated the very error the article did. In spades. I understand, your intention was to point out that quantum indeterminacy is distinct and more profound than more mundane ignorance-based indeterminacy. But you've done it by invoking a problematic metaphor of agency and recycling the notion of location to resuscitate determinism; as if the particle is just 'elsewhere' until "Nature" wishes to reward us for looking for it. The "asking" is indeed what 'causes' the particle to have a discrete location. That only seems confusing if you try to imagine the particle as an object, like the moon. So DDTT.

>quantum measurement almost gives us the same results as if our measurement just tells us where the particle was all along.

Your interpretation of my description is mistaken, again. I believe what I actually said (and none of your points actually disputes, although I understand why you find my perspective to lack the requisite mystified exacerbation of quantum weirdness you're used to) is that "quantum measurement" isn't a special thing, it is just measurement. And no matter how spooky, uncanny, weird, mystifying, and confusing the mechanisms of quantum systems get, somehow or other they do result in the behavior of the material objects our intuitions are informed by. Quantum particles aren't objects, they never have been, they don't have locations, they simply have localization determined by the necessity of their local effect, regardless of whether that is a measurement by a physicist or any other quantum particle interacting with it. People are rightfully confused and bemused by "spooky action at a distance". Why is that? Because it isn't an effect that is analogous to how larger objects (which are all entirely composed of quantum particles) behave.

>But they kept coming up with the results QM predicted all along.

That has been the case since the discovery of QM. Many of the greatest advancements in quantum physics have been the result of someone trying to disprove quantum physics, and successfully failing to achieve that goal.

Yes, of course, certainly. Now all you have to do is explain why, and how the size of the scale causes this profound difference in behavior, and your initial conjecture that quantum physics "has nothing to do" with the universe that arises from those quantum physics will be something more than stomping your foot and crying "no"!

> Among actual practicing physicists? No. Not often enough to matter.

In the context of their actual professional physics, that is beyond doubt. Unfortunately, outside of that restricted activity, physicists are as apt as any other person to expound upon what they believe are the implications of their physics. And what is worse, they are both more likely to believe their actual knowledge of physics provides them a privileged perspective of those philosophical implications, and to be referenced by people without that practical and professional knowledge of physics go suggest their skill in physics lends weight to their philosophical beliefs. Hence the need for the whole "shut up and calculate" perspective, as honored in the breach as the observance.

>Bohr did indeed understand the distinction, and did not deliberately try to confuse the issue

I understand your point, but I was not impugning his integrity. It was a poor choice of words on my part. The truth is the distinction itself is not so simple a matter, nor something physicists are qualified to assess to begin with. Bohr had a rational and scientific perspective on physics, as all good physicists must. But unfortunately, that is, in a real way, assuming a conclusion, from a philosophical perspective. Bohr assumed there is a [meta]physical truth that his work explored, as did Einstein; they were simply discussing what that truth was, which of their conflicting explanations was more accurate. Which means they were both failing to "shut up and calculate", but were instead using discourse and thought experiments (valid practices for physicists, I realize, but not physics) to attempt to ascertain which worldview to embrace based on their beliefs about the implications of their calculations rather than the calculations themselves.

>This misconception arises so often because physicists appropriated colloquial words for technical meaning,

I don't believe that is the case. The misconception arises often because of the nature of consciousness and quantum weirdness, and the potential for killing two birds with one stone, which most people find very tempting. The fact that scientists borrow words for use as symbols in logical expressions is an entirely separate issue, although I do agree it confounds things even further.

Well, I think you're overstating the case. Exactly what QM has to do with the deterministic objective universe most people believe is identified by the word "reality" is an open debate, but it seems definite that it isn't "nothing".

This is an issue everyone struggles with. If they do not, then clearly they are not trying hard enough.

>If I cannot perceive a thing, how can I know with certainty it exists?

Can you recognize how this relates to Einstein's comment about the moon? Are you saying that something does not exist unless you percieve it? More importantly how can you know with certainty that a thing exists even if you do perceive it?

My initial comment referenced metaphysical uncertainty (the perpetual inability to know if something exists independent of our observation), but the issue you have brought up regards epistemic uncertainty, whether our descriptions of a thing are accurate. This resolves, in classical philosophy, to the study of what it means to know. In my philosophy, we go further, and recognize epistemology as the study of meaning, with the meaning of the word "know" being merely a special and essential instance. Long story short, your question hinges on whether you (we) can know anything "with certainty".

To be direct, the answer is this: there is only one thing you (we) can know with certainty. How that one thing is expressed can vary. The Socratic approach is to say the only thing you can be certain of is that you cannot be certain of anything. The Cartesian approach, which I prefer, is cogito ergo sum: you can be certain you exist (without any additional characterization of that existence being implied), but everything after that is supposition and conjecture. In practical terms, we must ignore this necessary uncertainty (both metaphysic and epistemic) and make due with reasonable degrees of certainty, but the nature of philosophy is that it cannot be restricted to practical value.

Nevertheless, all we really need to do, all we can do, either philosophically or practically, is recognize that, although everything beyond that one thing is uncertain, that does not mean everything else is equally uncertain. So rather than spend all of our time "navel-gazing" and wondering what is certain, we instead consider how certain we are about specific and particular things, rather than the abstract general category "something".

As long as we do not confabulate metaphysical (existential) uncertainty and epistemic (intellectual) uncertainty, we can, in truth, leverage the absolute nature of our certainty about that one thing in order to examine and explore the various degrees of certainty which we need in order to understand the world and determine our conjectures with productive accuracy. When epistemic uncertainty prevents us from proceeding, because what we believe about a thing relates to how we experience it, we can rely on metaphysical certainty (something exists, and existence must mean objective physical existence) to ascertain what aspects of it are not related to our experience of it. When metaphysical uncertainty prevents us from proceeding, because we can only be aware of even the most objective things through our 'subjective' perceptions, we can rely on epistemic certainty by defining things quantitatively rather than experentially. By using this "latching bootstrap" mechanism, we can elevate our knowledge from the deeply profound uncertainty (brain in a jar, butterfly dream, insane absurdity) to the scientific certainty and emotional sincerity that enables us to be conscious, self-determining human beings. It has always been so, this methodology is not a recent development; it is simply the process of reasoning which humans have relied on since the moment we stopped being merely apes. It is just that recently, thanks to the double whammy of metaphysical knowledge of consciousness (as derived from the physical existence of our brains rather than supernatural entities) from Darwin's discovery of natural selection which opened the postmodern age and the epistemic knowledge of quantum mechanics (and the fact that even the most deterministic aspects of physical existence derive from probabilistic causation) which this conversation is focused on, conscious and conscientous examination of the process of knowing and reasoning and being have become common, and fodder for existential angst, rather than just what our brains and minds do innately without thinking about the thinking we think we're doing.

>Does something have to be verifiable to be true? Not sure if these questions make sense…

I understood them and consider them deep and profound. Whether that means they make sense is a whole other thing. 😉

No, something does not have to be verifiable to be true. But, if you are reasonable and intelligent and wish to be well-informed, a thing has to be verifiable for you to be certain it is true. This relates to your epistemic knowledge of its truth, not the metaphysical fact of its truth. This leaves open the question of just what sort of verification you are looking for and hoping to find. Just because epistemic and metaphysical uncertainty are unavoidable does not mean they should not both be minimized. But (if I can be forgiven for bringing the conversation back full circle to the matter of quantum uncertainty) it seems likely that they cannot both be minimalized simultaneously. In a very real way, being both metaphysically and epistemically certain of whether something is true is like measuring both the location and momentum of a quantum particle to an arbitrary level of accuracy. The principle of uncertainty in physics cannot be ignored simply because it is inconvenient or difficult to grasp, and the analogy to philosophical certainty seems almost too on-the-nose, but I don't believe it should be lightly dismissed based on that circumstance.

Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.

>You claimed to be interpreting it literally.

I am. Your implicit contention is made obvious by a literal interpretation of your language. It seems that you expect my interpretation to be naive, rather than merely literal; in presuming you were not speaking figuratively, I read your text literally.

>Gotcha!! 😁

You have revealed the fact, as I had already surmised, that you are interested in semantic games (and efforts at one-upsmanship amounting to desperate childishness) rather than intelligent discussion. Oops.

>This is actually an excellent question. For the answer, you can simply read my mind.

As always, I don't need to do so. All I need do is read your words, and the reason you are unable to answer the question is made obvious. I will refer you to my prior point, as regards your involuntary confession about the premise of your argumentation.

>that's a common misconception among laypeople

Unfortunately, it is also a common misperception among both physicists and philosophers, as well. In fact, there may well be good reason to believe that Bohr himself was willfully, perhaps even intentionally, confusing the issue to begin with. After all, we should not presume that, at the dawn of our exploration of quantum weirdness, even the most profoundly brilliant physicists knew just how weird things were going to get. The article seems more than slightly sensationalist, as almost any article on the subject of quantum mechanics is going to be, so it seems more of an inevitable rather than terrible choice for an essay which uses the phrase "quantum philosophy" in its title.

>As for physicalism... Lol, I will never pass up an opportunity to critique that!

The dialectic between a naive physicalism and a comprehensive one makes both critique and criticism unavoidable, I think.