It shouldn't be forced because people would reasonably reject giving up their freedom of conscious for welfare (principles that can't be reasonably rejected are ethical principles). Because of that, no one has the right to coerce someone else's conscious.

People would agree to principles that would allow for criminal law (as well as a welfare state and a duty to rescue). However, they wouldn't allow their freedom of conscious to be controlled by another. Whether to accept the utility coach's lifeplan is their own decision. This isn't to say that freedom has infinite value, but its not subject to the will of another based on ethical principles.

Yes, I agree, there is an is-ought distinction. I'm not a moral naturalist. I discuss the values necessary to create morality here. Morality is those principles that cannot be reasonably rejected in a hypothetical bargain behind a veil of ignorance. You have to value human freedom and reason to be motivated to obey that agreement, but morality exists in that sense whether or not someone has the requisite values to be moral.

>The questions "would you force someone to maximise their personal happiness" and "would you force someone to increase the happiness of humans collectively" are incomparable.

If you are a utilitarian, and welfare is your only standard of ethics, then there is no difference. Both questions only weigh an increase in welfare against coercion. I would argue that coercion in both questions is unjustified, but is there a principled distinction that you have between the two questions where they should be differentiated?

My substack argues that objective morality does exist (its wrong to torture babies for fun for example, regardless of one's own opinion).

The last section of asks whether you would force others to accept the utility coach. I even state: "My question is whether you would force other people to sign-up for the lifeplan." I'm not interested in one's personal choice, but how far this personal choice should be imposed onto others.

If satisfaction is all you care about, then people would be obligated to force others to accept the utility coach's offer. However, I argue that people should be free to make their own decisions, regardless of the amount of welfare on the table. And this personal freedom is valuable beyond personal welfare. Its something to be respected for its own sake, and its fundamental to ethics.

>So if you ask whether a utilitarian should hire the coach for themselves or others, the answer is probably no to both because doing so probably doesn't result in higher utility for society.

Although it would. Whether for yourself or someone else or society as a whole, the utility coach would increase utility.

And it wouldn't be forced on anyone because peoples free choices are to be respected. Paternalism is justified to a very limited extent, but not for all possible decisions.

Many utilitarians would disagree and wouldn't consider any utility resulting from harming another as factoring within their utilitarian calculus. I don't believe this distinction has any principle, but for the purpose of this thought experiment, one person's utility doesn't require harming another.

Although the question isn’t what satisfies yourself personally, but what you would force others to choose. If the utility coach would maximize a persons utility, without harming others, would you force that person to accept the utility coach’s offer? That’s what ethics is, our duties rather than our preferences.

Although now you are fighting the hypothetical by saying the utility coach doesn’t maximize utility, when the hypothetical says it does.

And the question is about ethics, not about preference. So being a utilitarian isn’t about satisfying ones own preferences, but satisfying the preferences of the greatest number. This includes creating a sense of free will as far as necessary to maximize utility. And the question asks whether you would force others to accept the utility coach. This answer is obvious if you’re a utilitarian, in which case everyone must accept the utility coach, but not if you value freedom for its own sake.

Although the utility coach would maximize your utility, which would factor in your preference for a belief in free will. You would be getting the highest utility possible under the coach.

And the important question isn't what you would choose, but what you would choose on behalf of others. If you're a utilitarian, then it would be a duty to take the coach's offer. But if you believe they should have a right to make the choice themselves, then you value freedom even above utility.

Hello all. I am writing a substack newsletter on contractualist ethics. The linked article describes a thought experiment that intends to show the importance of freedom in this philosophy, which is basically a revised version of Nozick’s “experience machine.”

Summary: Imagine a "utility coach" who is able to maximize a person’s utility so long as the person delegates all their decisions to the utility coach. If welfare is the basis of morality, are people morally bound to subject themselves to the utility coach's commands or should people be free to make their own choice of whether to accept the utility coach's bargain? What is more important, welfare or freedom?

That's descriptive, the social contract is normative.

I discuss hypothetical vs actual consent here. The contract is based on reason, so if there is a reason for prioritizing someone's identity (like class) to serve as a justification for restricting others, you should provide them.

I discuss that here. The social contract needs to be based on reason, rather than power. Class conflict may be useful in getting both sides of an issue and creating more accurate moral conclusions. But this conflict is instrumental.

Thank you!

However, if you don't do the work of meta-ethics, normative ethics tends to get sloppy. Terms go undefined and people adopt different normative standards. It's uncommon but necessary to start with first principles before getting into normative and applied ethics. Meta-ethics may be too philosophical and abstract for some, but the current confusion over ethics can be explained by the skipping of this first step.

The skeptic already values freedom, hence why he's asking. You can value both freedom and reason. However, freedom isn't agent-relative. Valuing freedom in one requires valuing it universally.

Because reason is valued.

You need values to have morals and what the skeptic values is a given

You can’t have morality without values, specifically freedom and reason

>the skeptic values reason. An arbitrary difference would violate that value.

> if its arranged in a certain way, then just replace my example with the cup and the desk together. The example can be anything with inherent value.

> the assumption that the value is dependent on something else. The premise is that X has value, not that X's value depends on Y. What I argue is that freedom has inherent value. Again, its not agent dependent since freedom is agency.

> If the cup is valued due to sentimental value, then its not inherent value. Its value is agent-relative.

You’re saying “related to itself” but what do you mean by that? If it’s something physical like the body, then any difference is still arbitrary. For instance, if the cup on my desk has a certain value, it has that value regardless of what desk it happens to be on. It wouldn’t make sense for it to change value if its physically on another desk (or if it did, that would require an additional premise that I’m not assuming). And any equivalent cup would have the same value.

But if you mean “related to itself” as in someone’s personal agency, then what I’m talking about doesn’t relate to itself. It’s just agency and doesn’t depend on someone’s personal agency. The thing doesn’t have value from relating to itself. It’s just a thing with value.

Yep, that’s the next step. Once the value of people’s freedom is recognized, they’ll act according to that value by obeying the term of the social contract, the expression of individuals’ freedom.

Well your neighbor in that case already has freedom. Now it’s just about recognition and valuing of freedom. But I wouldn’t argue that people would necessarily want others to have freedom (say non-conscious animals). All I argue is that freedom is equal in one dimension and because it’s not agent relative, must have a universal value in itself.

Then I still wouldn’t say there is a justification for valuing’s someone freedom at 0, given the status of freedom as an agency creating asset, rather than dependent on personal agency. So any claim that “X is valuable because it’s mine” isn’t justifiable since X’s value doesn’t rely on that persons personal agency.

Not valuing the same, but valuing at all. Only in the former question can you can get into issues of degrees. But the latter is binary.

If we both have possession X, and I value my X for itself, then I can’t say that your exact possession X isn’t valuable because I am me. It’s not a reason that can’t be reasonably rejected.

Children meanwhile are valued through an agent-relative relationship, unique between child and parent. But agency isn’t agent-relative but it’s agency itself. It’s a possession which everyone has in equal capacity and no justifiable difference exists (you can’t say that one is more free than others).

What’s being valued isn’t living status or welfare but the power of agency. Agency isn’t agent-relative but it’s agency itself. It’s a possession which everyone has in equal capacity and no justifiable difference exists (you can’t say that one is more free than others).