i'm aware, although many of these definitions can be convoluted. I use Gerald Dworkin's
definition here but what I mean by freedom is only consciousness/the experience of freedom.

Yes people freely move towards utility. This is why I argue freedom grounds the value of utility, since free people would pursue utility. I also wouldn't say people are pursuing freedom. They already have it, and are exercising it when they choose to improve their conditions.

You can think of the question as being "should people be free to increase their utility or should people be forced to increase their utility?" The former grounds ethics on freedom whereas the latter grounds it on welfare.

I will get into rights in a future article, however, so long as someone has freedom, they are a member of the moral universe. Other members cannot deny their freedom.

Reason requires valuing anothers freedom. Since there is no reason from which to deny the monk's freedom, killing him would be morally wrong.

Fair, I address that here. Let me know of any insufficiencies and I will address them in future posts.

I discuss it here, but what I mean by freedom is only the subjective experience of freedom. Someone can kill to maximize utility, which according to utilitarians is good. But we know its morally wrong.

Someone can kill in the name of freedom, yet except in very narrow cases (self-defense, defense of others), that person would be wrong according to my view since they are failing to respect another's freedom.

I talk about that here. When I say freedom, I mean only the experience of freedom.

I should have linked this article in the post, but I address it here.

Basically, since freedom is the foundation of morality, and others have freedom, the only way to create a moral system is through a social contract. The contract respects the freedom of others as it would include principles that cannot be reasonably rejected by free people.

So one's freedom to kill isn't moral, not because of the utility consequences, but because it doesn't respect another freedom by failing to abide by the social contract.

Yes, for example, utopians and fundamentalists have justified their brutal actions for the sake of the future well-being they were seeking to create. What're a few murders compared to the ideal communist state or an eternity in heaven?

Summary: Is freedom valuable because it lets us pursue utility, or is utility good because free people would pursue it? I argue the latter, grounding morality in freedom rather than utility.

First, valuing utility above all else can lead to morally perverse outcomes, as many hypotheticals have shown. These thought experiments can be satisfactorily resolved by valuing freedom instead. Second, utility arises as part of an amoral biological process of evolutionary adaptation. Something amoral cannot create something moral. Third, since utility is subjective, its utility is shaped by our freedom. How we choose to experience something determines its value to us. Freedom therefore grounds utility.

Making the case for these universal principles is the purpose of my newsletter. I've made a previous argument recognizing the foundational principles of all just societies in the link below. If you have any criticisms, I'd love to hear them so I can address them in future posts.

https://garik.substack.com/p/foundation-principles-and-formal

Part of what makes laws reasonable is that they reflect universal principles that free people would accept, which require certain procedural mechanisms and don't presume any substantive conceptions of justice.

It's like saying a fair contract is one where the process is fair, and the outcome isn't substantially unjust. If those conditions are met, the contract is upheld; if not it becomes voidable/void. This is still a weak requirement and reasonable law regimes would encompass every liberal democracy.

What reasonable people could agree to. Although this is more procedural fairness than substantive.

So long as rights are generally protected, the rule of law is respected, a functioning democratic process is in place, and the outcome isn't blantanly unjust, laws are reasonable (although not necessarily ideal).

Summary: There are three types of legal regimes. Reasonable law regimes are democratic institutions that respect the rule of law. As a result, citizens are morally obligated to obey the law when pursuing reform. Unreasonable law regimes are authoritarian, yet the government still has ideals of legitimacy that they seek to live up to. Under these regimes, civil disobedience is morally justified to force governments to live up to these ideals. And under non-law regimes, there is no legitimate relationship between the government and the people. Necessity is a justification for even violent acts under these regimes.

Thanks for the comment

I’ve addressed why utility isn’t foundational here

https://open.substack.com/pub/garik/p/the-utility-coach-thought-experiment?r=1pded0&utm_medium=ios&utm_campaign=post

And free will here https://open.substack.com/pub/garik/p/why-free-will-exists?r=1pded0&utm_medium=ios&utm_campaign=post

Freedom is foundational in that it’s required to underlie ethics and has a strong factual ground in our experience. And ethics needs to be built from there. A concern for the worlds welfare or our moral intuitions meanwhile are weak foundations and can’t be the basis of morality. Also, utilitarians have claimed we commit moral wrongs even as a result of actions beyond our control since outcomes matter rather than agency. Although since we can’t do anything about them, not focusing on them is strictly practicable.

I’ll be making more posts on utilitarianism in the future and I’d appreciate your thoughts.

I’ll be discussing reason, the authority over freedom, in a later post.

Some people have expressed concern that morality is a restriction on freedom, as if we are slaves. Yet normativity is the exchange of freedom for reasons. Any time there is an “I should” there is a reason that justifies restricting one’s freedom to do otherwise (see Kants hypothetical imperative).

Only when we get to morality do these reasons that restrict freedom take the form of universalizable moral principles (categorical imperative).

Thanks for the comment. I’ve addressed how we get to actual morality from freedom elsewhere.

https://open.substack.com/pub/garik/p/why-should-i-be-moral?r=1pded0&utm_medium=ios&utm_campaign=post

Summary: we don’t have morals with freedom alone. Rather we need reason as an authority over our freedom.

Freedom by itself does not create morality, yet the starting point for any moral system must be personal agency.

Let me know if there are necessary points of clarification and I’ll write about it in the future.

Sleeping people definitely have rights, as well as people under anesthesia. It’s the existing capacity for consciousness that’s morally relevant.

Sure!

Yes, freedom creates the capacity for morality. But it’s reason that binds freedom which actually establishes moral rules. Let me know if you have any topics you have questions about on this and I’ll try to write about them on my substack. Thanks for taking the time to comment and question.

Apologies, I’m trying to write less abstractly but I’ll continue to work on that.

The thesis of the article is that morality must rely on freedom. Morals can’t exist outside of freedom. Imagine a circle that represents freedom and a smaller circle inside it that represents our moral duties.

This has to be the case. We can’t have moral duties to do the impossible or control our involuntary functions. Therefore morality exists only within the realm of freedom. Additionally, the sense of freedom we experience is undeniable. It’s a strong foundation to rest an ethical theory on, yet it’s too often overlooked.

Additionally, our moral universe only includes free beings. Not objects, unconscious life or ideas. So whether a being is conscious is morally relevant.

Let me know if this helps.

Summary: Morality exists only within the boundaries of freedom. First, the experience of freedom is a certainty, a la Descartes. Second, freedom is the standard for judging moral claims. We cannot be held morally responsible for actions that are beyond our control. And moral claims must outweigh the value of personal choice.

Conscious experience also sets the inherent boundaries of our moral community, which would exclude non-conscious life, inanimate objects, and mental fictions. Although that does not exclude a trustee relationship.